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Abstract
Statistical analyses play an important role in employment
discrimination cases, as the Supreme Court has long recognized.
Regression analysis can help a plaintiff establish a claim of
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by
showing that, even when controlling for relevant characteristics,
individuals of a certain class were treated differently than other
employees or applicants. It can also help a defendant rebut such a
claim by showing that differential treatment was due to
characteristics other than being a member of a protected
class. Yet, too often, opposing experts present invalid rebuttal
evidence that the jury or judge overweighs. Opposing experts
routinely criticize three aspects of the regression: the regression’s
explanatory variables, its sample size, and its statistical
significance. Even though these factors affect the reliability of the
regression results only in very limited circumstances, the judge or
jury is often persuaded by them and find for the defendant. As a
result, valid regression analyses do not perform the critical work
that they should in employment discrimination cases. Our own
statistical analyses of seventy-eight Title VII employment
discrimination cases finds that regression analyses do not
* Professor of Law and Economics at Vanderbilt Law School, Co-Director
of the Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics.
** Ph.D. Candidate, Program in Law and Economics at Vanderbilt Law
School. J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt Law School.
We thank Lisa Bressman, Caroline Cecot, Benjamin McMichael, Michael Selmi,
Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Kevin Stack, and Michael Vandenbergh for their
valuable comments and Danielle Drago and Jean Xiao for research assistance.

2365

2366

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2365 (2014)

substantially increase the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing at
trial and that if the court recognizes any of these common
critiques, the plaintiff is much less likely to prevail. The severe
consequences of such critiques make it very important for the court
and opposing experts to recognize when these critiques are without
merit. We propose that courts adopt a peer-review system in which
court-appointed economists, compensated by each party as a
percentage of the total payment to econometric expert witnesses,
review econometric evidence before the reports are submitted to the
judge or jury.
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I. Introduction
“Do you have a low-pitched voice? Do you swear often? Have
you ever done any hunting? Have you participated in wrestling?
Have you participated in boxing? Have you played football on a
team?”1 These were questions asked during the hiring process for
sales representatives at Sears, Roebuck & Co. in the 1980s.2
While these questions may appear to be on their face
discriminatory, this evidence was not enough for a class of female
employees to establish gender discrimination in hiring in
E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.3 To bolster its case, the plaintiff
introduced regression analyses that showed that, controlling for
important factors including job applied for, age, education, jobtype experience, product-line experience, and commission-product
experience, females were statistically less likely to be hired as
sales representatives at Sears.4 However, this statistical evidence
did not improve the plaintiff’s case, as the defendant challenged
the regression analysis because it did not control for certain
factors deemed by Sears to be desirable for sales representatives,
including factors based on the above questions and “physical
appearance, assertiveness, the ability to communicate,
friendliness, and economic motivation.”5 Though the court
1. Ruth Milkman, Women’s History and the Sears Case, 12 FEMINIST STUD.
375, 382 (1986) (quoting Plaintiff’s Pretrial Brief at 34, E.E.O.C. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (No. 7964373)).
2. See id. (noting these questions were components of an applicant’s vigor
score, which was used to make hiring decisions).
3. See E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1318 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (“There is no credible evidence that a woman’s ‘vigor’ score ever prevented
her from being hired into commission sales at Sears. The court therefore finds
that Sears’ testing program did not discriminate against women . . . .”).
4. See id. at 1296 (discussing a weighted logit regression analysis that
used these six factors).
5. See id. at 1303 (“Other important factors not controlled for in EEOC’s
analysis are those characteristics which could be determined only from an
interview, not from the written application. These include physical appearance,
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acknowledged these qualities were difficult to quantify when
relying on this argument,6 the court did not require the defendant
to prove that these qualities varied with gender or to establish
statistically their importance in hiring. In part because of the
reliance on this invalid critique, the plaintiffs in this case were
left without recourse.7
Parties involved in discrimination cases have presented
statistical analyses to bolster their cases for decades.8 In fact, the
Supreme Court recognized the important role of statistical
analyses in discrimination cases more than thirty-five years ago
in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.9
While statistical analyses and, in particular, regression analyses
still maintain an important role in discrimination cases, that role
continues to be diminished by rebuttal evidence presented by the
opposing party.10 Too often, this rebuttal evidence presents
assertiveness, the ability to communicate, friendliness, and economic
motivation.”).
6. See id. at 1303 n.34 (“The court recognizes that these factors are not
easily quantified for purposes of a statistical analysis, and that data relating to
these factors was generally not available to EEOC from the application forms it
chose to rely upon.”).
7. See id. at 1353 (“Accordingly, based on the above findings of fact and
conclusions of law, it is hereby adjudged and ordered that judgment is entered
against plaintiff and in favor of defendant on all claims at issue in the trial of
this case, and plaintiff's claim for relief is hereby denied.”).
8. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989)
(“Moreover, evidence of a pattern of individual discriminatory acts can, if
supported by appropriate statistical proof, lend support to a local government's
determination that broader remedial relief is justified.”); Bazemore v. Friday,
478 U.S. 385, 387 (1986) (per curiam) (finding that the court of appeals erred by
disregarding petitioners’ statistical analyses even though the analyses reflected
salary disparities in place before Title VII applied to the defendant); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (ruling that on remand the
court must consider statistical evidence showing the employers’ work force was
racially balanced); United States v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining that statistical evidence of disparate impact may
suffice to establish a prima facie case of discrimination).
9. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977)
(“In any event, our cases make it unmistakably clear that ‘(s)tatistical analyses
have served and will continue to serve an important role’ in cases in which the
existence of discrimination is a disputed issue.” (citation omitted)).
10. See City of New York, 637 F. Supp.2d at 85 (explaining ways a
defendant can rebut statistical evidence presented by the plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination).
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invalid critiques that the jury or judge overweighs. As a result,
valid regression analyses are often incorrectly negated.
Proper regression analyses can serve an important role in
employment discrimination cases. They can help a plaintiff
establish a claim of discrimination under Title VII by showing
that, even when controlling for relevant characteristics,
individuals of a certain class were treated differently than other
employees or applicants.11 Alternatively, they can help a
defendant rebut such a claim by showing that differential
treatment was due to characteristics other than being a member
of a protected class.12 In addition, despite the Supreme Court’s
recognition in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes that regression
analyses may not always be appropriate,13 regression analyses
can still assist a class of plaintiffs trying to establish
commonality. Such regression analyses establish that the entire
class, as members of a protected class under Title VII,
experienced the same form of discrimination. Unfortunately, due
to incorrect challenges, often backed by expert witnesses,
regression analyses do not always serve these important
purposes.
All too often, once a party presents regression analyses to
assist its case, the opposing party launches spurious critiques
challenging the validity of the analyses.14 Then, without critically
evaluating those critiques, the judge either accepts the critiques
11. See, e.g., Lavin-McEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 478 (2d Cir.
2001) (discussing a regression analysis that showed the plaintiff was paid less
than male professors even after controlling for relevant factors such as
experience, tenure status, and type of degree).
12. See, e.g., Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d
1143, 1151 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (explaining how the defendant’s expert argued a
wage disparity was not based on race because, if the regression analysis
controlled for all performance evaluations, then race was not a statistically
significant factor).
13. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555–56 (2011)
(explaining that the regression analyses presented as evidence could not
establish commonality because a regional disparity does not prove that each
store within the region has the same disparity).
14. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1196 (10th Cir. 2006)
(providing an example of an expert attacking a statistical analysis because
variables were missing from the study, even though the expert did not
demonstrate that the missing variables affected the statistical significance of
the results).
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as valid support for a motion or allows the critiques to enter the
courtroom, where the critiques are overweighed by the jury. This
often leads to an unbalanced discussion about everything
potentially wrong with the analyses, instead of a discussion about
their actual validity. For example, throughout the highly
publicized litigation of Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,15 the
plaintiffs’ and defendant’s experts debated whether the presented
regression analysis established class commonality and provided
evidence that Wal-Mart discriminated against female employees
by paying them less.16 As the Northern District of California
noted in a full 25% of its class-certification motion, the
defendant’s expert claimed that the plaintiffs’ regression analysis
was invalid because it failed to separately analyze each division
of each store and incorrectly analyzed the entire sample of
employees within a region at once.17
This unbalanced discussion occurs frequently. All too often
the opposing experts criticize three aspects of the regression: the
regression’s explanatory variables, its sample size, and its
statistical significance, all of which affect the reliability of the
regression results only in very limited circumstances.18 By
15. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
16. See id. at 155 (“Plaintiffs present largely uncontested descriptive
statistics which show that women working in Wal-Mart stores are paid less than
men in every region, that pay disparities exist in most job categories, that the
salary gap widens over time even for men and women hired into the same
jobs . . . .”).
17. See id. at 156 (explaining the defendant’s contention that the statistical
analysis at the regional level fails to account for significant differences in
compensation practices among the individual stores). These arguments
eventually led the Supreme Court of the United States to hold that the
statistical evidence presented by the plaintiffs did not establish a company-wide
policy of gender discrimination required for commonality and for class
certification, establishing precedent limiting the use of regression analysis in
class certification motions. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2555–56.
18. See, e.g., Franklin v. Local 2 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Assoc.,
565 F.3d 508, 514 (8th Cir. 2009) (providing an example of criticism based on
variables omitted from the regression that may alter the results); Coleman v.
Exxon Chem. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 593, 618 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (providing an
example of criticism based on a sample size of forty individuals even though
eight individuals were members of the relevant protected class); Boyd v.
Interstate Brands Corps., 256 F.R.D. 340, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (providing an
example of an expert challenging a plaintiff’s statistical analysis because of
statistical significance).
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focusing on these presented econometric criticisms, the judge or
jury is often persuaded that this evidence is not reliable, and as a
result, strong and valid evidence of discrimination is disregarded,
and the defendant prevails.19 This Article analyzes the
presentation of these critiques in Title VII employment
discrimination cases and proposes ways for the court to avoid
allowing an unbalanced discussion of potential econometric
critiques to negate such valuable evidence. Our own statistical
analyses of seventy-eight published employment discrimination
cases finds that regression analyses do not increase substantially
the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing at trial and that, if the
court recognizes any of these common critiques, the plaintiff is
much less likely to prevail. The severe consequences of such
critiques make it even more important for the court and for
opposing experts to recognize when these critiques themselves
are without merit.
This Article begins by discussing how regression analyses are
presented in employment discrimination cases and by analyzing
the court’s recognition of the potential problems with the
analyses. Part III discusses three of the most common, invalid
econometric critiques found in employment discrimination cases:
omitted variables, sample size deficiencies, and lack of statistical
significance. Part III also establishes the rare circumstances
when these critiques are actually valid. Part IV then presents a
statistical analysis of published employment discrimination
cases, showing the consequences of discounting regression
analyses through the presentation of invalid or overweighed
critiques. This analysis shows that when the defendant presents
critiques of the plaintiff’s regression, the plaintiff is statistically
significantly less likely to prevail. This Article concludes by
proposing that courts adopt a peer review system to evaluate the
validity of critiques proffered by opposing counsel during
evidentiary deliberations.

19. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1344
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (discussing the court’s finding that important variables were
omitted) aff’d 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
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II. Econometrics in the Courtroom

As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Teamsters,
regression analysis serves an important role in establishing
discrimination.20 As a result, parties often introduce regression
analyses in Title VII employment discrimination cases.21 One
scholar noted in 1992 that “since [Teamsters], statistical evidence,
most commonly multiple regression analysis, has become the
primary means of establishing wage discrimination in disparate
treatment cases.”22 Generally, the regressions help establish that
the individuals were less likely to receive a promotion or to be
hired or that they received lower wages because they were
members of a protected class.23 Of course, as was acknowledged
in Bazemore v. Friday,24 regression analyses, when flawed, can
20. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977)
(noting that statistical analyses play an important role in cases where
discrimination is a disputed issue).
21. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 399 (1986) (per curiam)
(discussing the petitioners’ heavy reliance on multiple regression analyses to
demonstrate a pay disparity based on race); Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of
Am., 380 F.3d 459, 468 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting methodological deficiencies in a
plaintiff’s regression analyses in a Title VII case); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d
1249, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Multiple regression is a form of statistical analysis
used increasingly in Title VII actions . . . .”). Plaintiffs also often present such
evidence in Fair Housing Act claims, in RICO claims, and in constitutional
challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. Nat’l
City Bank, 277 F.R.D. 148, 155 (E.D. Pa. 2011), (discussing the use of regression
analyses in a Fair Housing Act case) aff’d, 726 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2013);
Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. v. Pfizer, Inc., 712 F.3d 21, 30–31 (1st
Cir. 2013) (noting that the primary evidence in a RICO case was expert
testimony describing a regression analysis); Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla. v.
Metro. Dade Cnty., 122 F.3d 895, 917 (11th Cir. 1997) (discussing the use of
regression analyses in an Equal Protection Clause case).
22. James T. McKeown, Statistics for Wage Discrimination Cases: Why the
Statistical Models Used Cannot Prove or Disprove Sex Discrimination, 67 IND.
L.J. 633, 633 (1992).
23. See infra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (giving one example of
such regression). Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
color, national origin, and religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). In addition, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits discrimination on the
basis of age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.
Finally, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibits wage disparities between men and
women for equal work. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
24. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
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provide inadequate support for such cases.25 This Part provides
an overview of how regression analyses are used in employment
discrimination cases and discusses the evidentiary standards
that federal courts follow when addressing regression analyses as
evidence.
A. Econometrics in Employment Discrimination Cases
Plaintiffs often present expert testimony and reports that
include regression analyses to support a claim of employment
discrimination.26 Such employment discrimination claims include
claims of sex, race, color, or national origin discrimination under
Title VII, age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA),27 sex discrimination under the Equal
Pay Act (EPA),28 and disability discrimination under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).29 In these cases, the
plaintiffs’ expert witnesses present statistics showing that, all
other qualifications equal, being a member of a protected class
decreased the plaintiff’s expected wage or likelihood of receiving a
promotion or being hired.30 Alternatively, defendants often
present regression analyses to establish that there was not a
differential in hiring, promotions, or wages between the protected
class and other similarly situated employees.31
While regression analyses are common in class action cases,
such as Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,32 plaintiffs also often
25. See id. at 400 n.10 (1986) (“There may, of course, be some regressions
so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant; but such was clearly not the
case here.”).
26. See cases cited supra note 21 (citing cases in which regression analyses
were conducted by experts and presented as evidence).
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34.
28. Id. § 206(d).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
30. See, e.g., Lavin-McEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 478 (2d Cir.
2001) (discussing a statistical analysis that showed the plaintiff was paid less
than male professors even after controlling for relevant factors such as
experience, tenure status, and type of degree).
31. See, e.g., Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d
1143, 1151 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (explaining the defendant’s expert’s use of statistical
evidence to rebut the contention that a wage disparity was based on race).
32. See 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011) (discussing regression analyses the
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introduce regression analyses in individual employment
discrimination claims.33 In individual claims, this evidence can be
used to establish disparate treatment claims, which allege that
the employer treated the plaintiff worse than similarly situated
individuals due to his or her protected class, or to establish
underlying disparate impact claims, which allege that the
defendant’s policies have a differential impact on members of a
protected class.34 For example, in Lavin-McEleney v. Marist
College,35 the plaintiff, Ms. Lavin-McEleney, filed a disparate
treatment claim, alleging that her employer, Marist College, paid
her lower wages than her male counterparts.36 To establish such
a claim, the plaintiff presented expert-witness reports that
included regression analyses, which analyzed the wages of each
professor at Marist College.37 These regressions controlled for
characteristics that could influence each professor’s wage
separately from his or her sex, and the results showed a
significant wage disparity on the basis of sex.38 This evidence,
along with anecdotal evidence, led the jury to find for the plaintiff
and led the Second Circuit to uphold this decision.39
Plaintiffs often present regression analyses as evidence in
class action discrimination cases to support a pattern or practice
in a disparate treatment discrimination claim and to establish
plaintiffs argued were evidence of commonality).
33. See Derrickson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689 (D.
Md. 2000) (noting the use of a regression analysis as evidence in an individual’s
claim that he was denied a promotion based on his race).
34. Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof of Discrimination: Beyond
“Damned Lies,” 68 WASH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1993) (“Under disparate-impact
theory, the plaintiff challenges a facially neutral employment practice on the
ground that it produces an adverse––if only inadvertent––effect on a protected
group.”).
35. 239 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2001).
36. See id. at 478 (discussing the plaintiff’s allegation that her raises were
discriminatory because she was not promoted to a full professor despite her
request to have her salary reviewed for gender disparity).
37. See id. at 482 (noting that the expert used salaries of the entire faculty
to attain a sufficiently large sample size).
38. See id. at 478 (“[The plaintiff’s expert] found that the plaintiff was paid
significantly less than comparable male professors within the division.”).
39. See id. at 481 (“We hold that statistical evidence of gender based salary
disparity among comparable professors properly contributed to plaintiff’s case in
conjunction with her identification of a specific male comparator.”).
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commonality between the members of the class as required by
statute.40 Notably, the Supreme Court of the United States
addressed the requirement of commonality in Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes, a nationwide class action of female employees
alleging that Wal-Mart discriminated against females in their
pay and promotion practices.41 In Dukes, the plaintiffs were
seeking both injunctive and declaratory relief.42 To establish
commonality and a prima facie case of gender discrimination, the
plaintiffs presented expert reports using regression analyses to
show that the plaintiffs, as females, received statistically
significant lower wages and were less likely to receive promotions
than their male counterparts.43 Ultimately, the Court thought
that the region-by-region regressions were insufficient to
establish that the discrimination was typical of the employer’s
practices because it could not establish a uniform, store-by-store
wage and promotion disparity.44
However, since Dukes, courts have permitted regression
analyses as support for more limited class claims. In Ellis v.
Costco Wholesale Corp.,45 the Northern District of California
distinguished a nationwide class of female employees alleging
40. Plaintiffs in a class action can also allege disparate treatment claims.
Browne, supra note 34.
41. See 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011) (“[T]he Court of Appeals approved the
certification of a class comprising about one and a half million plaintiffs, current
and former employees of petitioner Wal-Mart who allege that the discretion
exercised by their local supervisors over pay and promotion matters violates
Title VII by discriminating against women.”).
42. See id. (“In addition to injunctive and declaratory relief, the plaintiffs
seek an award of back pay.”).
43. See id. at 2555 (explaining that, after the plaintiffs’ expert conducted a
regression analysis, he concluded that “there are statistically significant
disparities between men and women at Wal-Mart . . . [and] these
disparities . . . can only be explained by gender discrimination” (citation
omitted)). The Court had to address Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the
class as a whole.” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23).
44. See id. (“A regional pay disparity, for example, may be attributable to
only a small set of Wal-Mart stores, and cannot by itself establish the uniform,
store-by-store disparity upon which the plaintiffs’ theory of commonality
depends.”).
45. 285 F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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gender discrimination against their employer from the class in
Dukes.46 The court distinguished the class because of its smaller
size, because it was limited to two positions with uniform job
descriptions, and because it identified specific practices of the
employer in one type of promotion.47 As a result, the court did
look to the regression analyses to establish commonality, and
because the regression analyses established class-wide (and not
localized) gender disparities, the court found commonality and
certified the class.48
Ellis shows that even after Dukes, regression analyses can
provide evidence of commonality in class action employment
discrimination cases as well as establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination (either disparate impact or disparate
treatment claims). However, as was the case in both Ellis and
Dukes, such analyses are usually heavily scrutinized by the
opposing party’s conflicting expert testimony.49 Unfortunately,
despite the presence of evidentiary standards to help guide the
court, judges and juries are not often equipped to analyze the
strength of such conflicting testimony.
B. Economists as Experts
Generally, regression analyses must be ruled admissible
under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which allows an
expert qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
46. See id. at 509 (“As explained further below, the proposed classes in the
instant case differ from that examined in Dukes in several material ways.”).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 530 (“Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence demonstrates classwide—
as opposed to fragmented or localized—gender disparities supporting its
contention that Defendant’s classwide practices yield classwide effects.”).
49. See id. at 521 (noting that defendant’s expert conducted a statistical
study and found no evidence of gender disparity); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011) (“The parties dispute whether Bielby’s [the
plaintiffs’ expert] testimony even met the standards for the admission of expert
testimony under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 702 and our Daubert
case . . . .”). For a discussion of common critiques of regression analyses in class
action cases, including sample size issues, see William T. Bielby & Pamela
Coukos, “Statistical Dueling” with Unconventional Weapons: What Courts
Should Know About Experts in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 56
EMORY L.J. 1563 (2007).
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education” to testify and give opinions if: (1) the testimony will
assist the trier of fact; (2) it is “based on sufficient facts or data;”
(3) it is “the product of reliable principles and methods;” and
(4) “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.”50 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,51 the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted Rule
702 to require the judge to exercise general gatekeeping functions
and limit scientific and technical expert testimony based on
whether it “can be (and has been) tested, whether it has been
subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential
error rate and the existence of maintenance of standards
controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread
acceptance within a relevant scientific community.”52
Generally, a federal judge must determine whether to grant
motions to strike expert testimony under Rule 702, and the judge
must make this decision under Daubert. However, the vague
language of Rule 702 and of the Daubert standard do not provide
much guidance for this decision, and the judge must decide
whether the theory or technique behind the scientific testimony
meets Daubert’s requirements. Ultimately, this is a large burden,
and “[a]ssessing these factors can be daunting for experts trained
in science—judges and their clerks, as scientific laymen, will have
even more trouble.”53
The Daubert analysis is very important for the introduction
of expert reports on regression analyses because of the complex
nature of the studies and the ability of the studies to be
manipulated. When experts present regression analyses as
evidence of employment discrimination in Title VII cases, it is
very important for the judge to take his or her gatekeeping
function under Daubert very seriously. It is worthwhile to
50. FED. R. EVID. 702.
51. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
52. Id. at 593–94.
53. Lawrence S. Pinsky, The Use of Scientific Peer Review and Colloquia to
Assist Judges in the Admissibility Gatekeeping Mandated by Daubert, 34 HOUS.
L. REV. 527, 543 (1997); see also Justin P. Murphy, Expert Witnesses at Trial:
Where Are the Ethics?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 227 (2000) (“The
determination of reliability can present a significant burden for trial court
judges. Trial court judges are asked under rule 702 to be ‘better equipped than
an honestly-testifying expert to know whether the expert’s opinion is reliable.
That is an unlikely premise.’” (citation omitted)).
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consider the incentives of parties to litigation to present empirical
evidence and, especially, the incentive of the plaintiff. Parties are
not obligated to present statistical evidence of discrimination.
This is especially true in disparate treatment cases, where
specific examples of discriminatory treatment are likely to be
more persuasive than dry statistics.54
Given the upfront costs involved in hiring an economic expert
to conduct regression analyses, as well as the ease (as we show
infra) with which defendants can rebut valid statistical evidence
by misleading or confusing jurors, plaintiffs should only be
incentivized to present regression evidence when the statistical
methodology utilized is consistent with professional standards.
As a result, the general concerns with expert testimony may be
diminished in the presentation of regressions presented by the
plaintiffs, making the Daubert analysis less important. However,
defendants still have incentives to present invalid attacks, and
those attacks should also be scrutinized. This Article proposes
that not only should the judge consider the reliability of the
regressions presented in favor of the plaintiff, but the judge must
also consider the reliability of the critiques that the defendant
presents because the introduction of invalid attacks on regression
analyses can negate the presentation of reliable evidence that
suggests discrimination. Unfortunately, courts have adopted the
defendant’s attacks on the plaintiff’s regression analyses in many
cases, and the Supreme Court has acknowledged when this
adoption is problematic.55

54. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 399 (1977)
(“[T]his was not a case in which the Government relied on ‘statistics alone.’ The
individuals who testified about their personal experiences with the company
brought the cold numbers convincingly to life.”).
55. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 401 (1986) (per curiam) (finding
that “the Court of Appeals failed utterly to examine the regression analyses in
light of all the evidence in the record”). The Court reasoned that, “[w]hile the
omission of variables from a regression analysis may render the analysis less
probative than it otherwise might be, it can hardly be said, absent some other
infirmity, that an analysis which accounts for the major factors ‘must be
considered unacceptable as evidence of discrimination.’” Id. at 400 (citation
omitted). Accordingly, the Court ruled that “[n]ormally, failure to include
variables will affect the analysis’ probativeness, not its admissibility.” Id.
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C. The Court’s Recognition of Potential Problems
Even before Daubert controlled the introduction of expert
evidence under Rule 702, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the
methodological concerns of statistics as evidence of employment
discrimination. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States,56 the United States presented statistical evidence
to support their claim of race discrimination in pay and
promotion practices.57 After emphasizing the value of such
evidence, the Court then cautioned “that statistics are not
irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind
of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness
depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.”58
Following Teamsters, legal scholars also began to acknowledge
the potential manipulation and problems associated with
econometrics in the courtroom, and expert witnesses began to
present convincing, but often invalid, critiques of the opponent
expert’s analysis that surrounded the choice of variables
controlled for in the regression.59
A highly visible example of valid statistical evidence being
rebutted following Teamsters occurred in E.E.O.C. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.60 At the time, Sears was the second largest private
employer of women in the United States.61 In Sears, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought a sex
discrimination suit against Sears and supported that suit with
regression analyses that showed a disparity between the hiring

56. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
57. See id. at 399–400 (discussing case law that supports the use of
statistical evidence to establish discrimination).
58. Id. at 340.
59. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1048, 1095 (1985) (arguing that the expanded use of multiple regression
techniques is accompanied by the possibility of their misuse). To avoid misuse,
Rubinfeld recommended that expert testimony include whether results were
sensitive to the choice of variables used in the regression model. Id.
60. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
61. See Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Academic Freedom and
Expert Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1629, 1641
(1988) (noting that during the period covered by the litigation Sears was the
second largest employer of women outside of the federal government).
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and paying of males and females.62 However, the court discounted
the regression analysis that showed that females were less likely
to be hired into higher-paying commission sales jobs at Sears
because of the “omission and inadequate coding of important
variables.”63 These factors included “the applicant’s interest in
commission sales and in the product to be sold, . . . physical
appearance, assertiveness, the ability to communicate,
friendliness, and economic motivation.”64 Even though the court
recognized that these factors were difficult to quantify, it noted
that the absence of the factors meant that the plaintiff expert’s
analyses were entitled to less weight.65 The court also accorded
less weight to the regressions analyzing the salaries of the
employees because the regressions did not control for several
measurable variables including “veteran status, marital status
and size of family, leaves of absence and college major” and
unquantifiable variables, including “loyalty, dedication, and
motivation.”66 The Northern District of Illinois incorrectly relied
on the premise that “[i]t is important to include all variables that
significantly influence the dependent variable.”67
The notion that it is important to include all variables that
may affect the dependent variable in a regression analysis
attempting to prove employment discrimination had become so
62. See Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1302–03 (discussing the court’s criticism of
the EEOC’s statistical evidence).
63. See id. at 1302 (concluding the EEOC’s analysis was flawed because of
its “failure to include in its analysis many important factors that significantly
affect the hiring process”).
64. Id. at 1302–03. The plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Siskin, introduced
compensation regressions that accounted for the following variables: sex; time in
present assignment; time in present assignment squared; additional time in
checklist; additional time in checklist squared; additional time at company;
additional time at company squared; territory of employee; job performance;
whether employee was hired as a college trainee; whether the facility was
located in an urban area; and education. Id. at 1339. It should be noted that a
regression that takes into account these factors easily meets professional
standards for publication in peer-reviewed economics journals. Infra Part III.A.
65. See Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1303 n.34 (“The court recognizes that these
factors are not easily quantified for purposes of a statistical analysis, and that
data relating to these factors was generally not available to
EEOC . . . . Therefore, Dr. Siskin's analyses are entitled to less weight to the
extent they do not incorporate these factors.”).
66. Id. at 1344–45.
67. Id. at 1287. This incorrect reliance will be explained in Part III.A, infra.
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prominent in the 1980s that some courts began to recognize its
misuse. United States Department of Treasury v. Harris Trust
and Savings Bank68 was an administrative proceeding in which
the Department of Labor and the Department of Treasury alleged
that Harris discriminated against women and minorities in
violation of Executive Order 11246.69 During the proceeding, the
plaintiff’s expert presented a regression analysis that controlled
for education, school major, experience, and prior experience, and
the defendant challenged the regression due to omitted
variables.70 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) then recognized
that every regression excludes certain variables that may affect
an employment decision and injected a very satirical but telling
story in footnote thirty-six:
The story is told about how detailed records were kept
between 1900 and 1982 of the amount of krill estimated to
have been eaten by all Antarctic mammals. A statistical whiz,
with unlimited use of free computer time, compared these
observations with both the gross national product of Lithuania
in 1985 and the sale of liters of wine in Andorra in 1986. He
found several direct correlations. He concluded that he could
show that krill eaten was an absolute predictor for all sorts of
phenomena if given appropriate access to a free computer. It is
also told that he received large fees in many court cases by
testifying about how krill eaten in Antarctic was the missing
variable in the statistical analysis of one party or another in
merger and discrimination matters. Luckily, no such
presentation was made in this case and this “omitted” variable
was not addressed.71

Contrary to the court in Sears, the ALJ then stated that, “while
the weight given the evidence may be reduced as a refinement of
the variables is made, [the U.S. expert’s] study still contributes to
the Plaintiff's case.”72

68. 78-OFC-2, ALJ’s Recommended Decision (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 22, 1986).
69. Id. at 4.
70. See id. at 24 (noting that Harris attacked the validity of the
government’s statistical evidence by contending that adjustment bias and
omitted variables permeated the statistical evidence).
71. Id. at 33 n.36.
72. Id. at 33.
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The Supreme Court addressed in Bazemore v. Friday73 the
legitimacy of regression analyses in employment discrimination
cases even when such regressions do not include every variable
the defendant claims is relevant.74 In Bazemore, multiple black
employees alleged racial discrimination in payment practices.75
To support this claim, the plaintiffs introduced statistical
evidence, including regression results that showed a large pay
disparity between black and white employees with the same job
title, education, and tenure.76 However, the District Court refused
to accept the evidence as proof of discrimination, and the Court of
Appeals upheld that determination.77 The Supreme Court
addressed the potentially valid reason for such refusal: the
regressions failed to consider “a number of variable factors” that
were relevant in salary considerations.78 Although the
regressions controlled for the variables that were identified by an
Extension Service official as most determinative of salary
(education, tenure, and job title) in addition to race, the
defendants offered nine additional variables that they claimed
needed to be included for the regression to be valid.79 The
defendant argued that the plaintiffs’ failure to include these

73. 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986).
74. See id. at 400 (per curiam) (“While the omission of variables from a
regression analysis may render the analysis less probative than it otherwise
might be, it can hardly be said, absent some other infirmity, that an analysis
which accounts for the major factors ‘must be considered unacceptable as
evidence of discrimination.’”).
75. Id. at 394.
76. See id. at 398 (discussing the variables used in the regression analysis
and explaining that the “[p]etitioners selected these variables based on
discovery testimony by an Extension Service official that four factors were
determinative of salary: education, tenure, job title, and job performance”). The
average pay disparity in 1975 was $395 a year, which was a disparity of about
3% of average annual salary in that year ($12,524). The average pay disparity in
1974 was $331 a year. Id. at 399.
77. See id. at 399 (“The Court of Appeals stated: [t]he district court refused
to accept plaintiffs’ expert testimony as proof of discrimination . . . because the
plaintiffs’ expert had not included a number of variable factors the court
considered relevant . . . . The district court was, of course, correct in this
analysis.”).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 404 n.15 (noting that the district court listed nine variables it
believed petitioners should have accounted for in their regression).
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variables resulted in a false showing of discrimination.80 But the
Supreme Court recognized that, even though omitted variables
can make regression analyses less probative, this consideration
should not usually be made at the admissibility stage.81 In fact,
the Supreme Court noted that, because the burden of proof is
preponderance of the evidence, regression analyses that do not
include “all measurable variables” can “serve to prove a plaintiff’s
case.”82 As a result, the Court remanded the case for the lower
court to consider the statistical evidence in light of the entire
record.83 Unfortunately, some courts and opposing experts still
maintain that if any seemingly plausible variable can be declared
an “omitted” variable, then the regression analysis is too
unreliable to “prove a plaintiff’s case.”84
Following Bazemore, courts should have been less likely to
discount the proof offered by regression analyses that fail to
include every measureable variable. Unfortunately, Bazemore did
not influence all courts in this manner. In fact, after Bazemore,
the Seventh Circuit addressed the omitted variables in Sears and
found “that the EEOC’s failure to support its choice of variables
in this case casts a shadow on the probative value of the
regression analyses incorporating those variables.”85 The Seventh
Circuit acknowledged Bazemore but recognized that the district
court likely considered the regressions to be “so incomplete as to
be inadmissible as irrelevant,” which is the exception to the
admissibility standards as recognized by the Supreme Court in
Bazemore.86 The Seventh Circuit found that the district court’s
80. See id. at 399–400 (noting that the district court found that the
regression analysis was not valid evidence of discrimination because experts
failed to include variables which “ought to be reasonably viewed as
determinants of salary”).
81. See id. at 400 (finding that failure to include variables affects
probability, not admissibility).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 386–87 (holding that the “Court of Appeals erred in
disregarding petitioners’ statistical analysis . . . [and] that on remand, the Court
of Appeals should examine all of the evidence in the record . . .”).
84. See E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 349 (7th Cir. 1988)
(finding that the district court did not err in concluding that the EEOC
regression analysis was flawed due to omitted variables and incomplete data).
85. Id. at 326.
86. Id. at 327 (quoting Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 n.10 (1986)).
The Fourth Circuit also addressed how Bazemore applies during a summary
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criticisms of the regression analysis were not clearly erroneous
and upheld the decision for the defendant.87
The lower court decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
provides an example of the court properly acknowledging
Bazemore, but it also shows that defendants continued to make
the same arguments following Bazemore. To establish class
commonality and underlying disparate treatment in wages for
women, the plaintiffs presented regression analyses that
controlled for a number of major variables, including: “gender,
length of time with the company, number of weeks worked during
the year, whether the employee was hir[ed] or terminated during
the year, full-time or part-time, which store the employee worked
in, whether the employee was ever hired into a management
position, job position, and job review ratings.”88 The defendant’s
expert (Dr. Haworth, who was also the expert in Sears) claimed,
“[T]hese variables do not fully reflect [Wal-Mart’s] compensation
decision-making structure, thereby leaving open the possibility
that one or more missing variables could explain the gender
disparities in question.”89 The eleven other variables that Dr.
Haworth recognized were quite similar to those she recognized in
Sears: “hours worked, seniority, leave of absence, full-time/parttime status at hire, recent promotion or demotion, prior grocery
experience, pay group, night shift, department, store size, and
store profitability.”90 When the defendant sought to exclude the
plaintiffs’ regression from trial, the Northern District of
judgment motion and agreed that, due to the omission of variables measuring
performance, the probative value of the regression analysis was an issue of
material fact for the jury to decide in Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth
University. See 84 F.3d 672, 676–77 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a question of
material fact existed as to whether actual performance factors should have been
included in the university’s analysis). In this case, the defendant, VCU,
presented a regression analysis to support its adoption of an affirmative action
program for women, and the district court relied on this regression to find for
VCU on summary judgment; however, due to the alleged flaws of the regression,
the Fourth Circuit overturned the motion. Id. at 677.
87. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d at 348 (noting that “the district
court’s finding that the EEOC had not proved sex discrimination in wages
through its flawed multiple regression analyses is not clearly erroneous”).
88. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 159 (N.D. Cal 2004).
89. Id.
90. Id.; see E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 330 (7th Cir.
1988) (discussing Haworth’s regression analysis in Sears).
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California quoted Bazemore, denied the motion, and determined
that the regression went “well above the minimal threshold
established by the courts, and thus his analysis is sufficient to
raise an inference of discrimination for purposes of this motion.”91
Ultimately, the defendant continued to make this argument
throughout the trial, and the argument influenced the Supreme
Court when the Court rejected the regression analyses as proof of
commonality or of disparate treatment.92
Many courts acknowledge Bazemore and the fact that
econometric critiques challenging regression analyses should only
affect the admissibility of regression analyses as evidence of
employment discrimination in situations in which the regression
analyses are “so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant.”93
However, defendants continue to make these arguments in court,
and even though some courts correctly apply the admissibility
standard, these arguments are also admitted, such that invalid
critiques continue to diminish or eliminate the probativeness of
the plaintiff’s regression results. The three critiques that we
found to be the most commonly argued in court are presented in
the following section. The consequences of admitting the critiques
when they are invalid are illustrated in the following empirical
study. Recent examples of these consequences and of the court
avoiding such consequences are presented in Part V.
III. Three Econometric Critiques
A review of employment discrimination judicial opinions and
expert witness reports illustrates that opposing experts routinely
offer the same three critiques to rebut a plaintiff’s regression
91. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 160.
92. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555–56 (2011)
(finding that respondents’ statistical proof and regression analyses failed to
provide evidence of commonality either regionally, or, if the proof did exist,
nationally).
93. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d at 326, 327 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting
that the district court did not find the EEOC’s analysis inadmissible due to
failure to include variables, but instead found the analyses were not probative
such that they were “so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant,”
qualifying as the exception to the rule in Bazemore) (quoting Bazemore v.
Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 n.10 (1986)).
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analysis. These three critiques are omitted variables, adequacy of
sample, and lack of statistical significance.94 To determine the
prominence of these three issues and to analyze how courts treat
each issue, we searched for all Title VII employment
discrimination cases filed in the federal courts since 2000 that
mention “regression analysis.” This search resulted in a sample of
seventy-eight cases.95 This Part discusses these three prominent
econometric issues as they pertain to Title VII employment
discrimination cases and identifies when and why these critiques
are overwhelmingly invalid.
A. Omitted Variables
In over 63% of the cases gathered, the court recognized that
the opposing expert notes that the regression did not control for
all measurable variables that may affect the treatment of the
employees.96 More specifically, courts frequently note (as the
result of opposing expert testimony) that the plaintiff’s regression
analyses do not control for certain variables that the defendant
argues are important determinants of employment decisions.
This was the issue at hand in Bazemore.97 Legal scholars have
94. See generally Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (addressing
omitted variables); Thomas v. Deloitte Consulting LP, No. 3-02-CV-0343-M,
2004 WL 1960097 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2004) (addressing issues relating to
statistical significance); Coleman v. Exxon Chem. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 593
(S.D. Tex. 2001) (noting problems with the sample size).
95. The citations to each case are listed in Table A of the Appendix. This
sample is the result of a Westlaw search and, as such, does not represent all
federal employment discrimination cases in which plaintiffs presented
regression analyses. However, the statistics gathered from the search still
provide insight into the prominence of such issues and anecdotal evidence
gathered from the opinions provides insight into how courts address such issues.
While the original search that resulted in the sample was for “regression
analysis,” a search for cases published between “regression analys!” results in
the same sample. We did not expand the search to include “regression” because
the courts almost always use “analysis[es]” and often use “regression” for its
noneconometric meaning. The original search resulted in 177 cases; however,
many of these cases were duplicates, many of the cases simply referenced other
cases that presented regression analyses, and many of the cases simply
referenced a Title VII case in the opinion.
96. See infra Table 2.
97. See 478 U.S. 385, 400–01 (1986) (noting the differences between
plaintiffs’ variables and defendants’ variables).
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recognized since 1986 that defendants attack plaintiff’s
regressions for “fail[ing] to account for important explanatory
factors.”98 That all potential variables are not included is a
characteristic of regression analysis and does not reflect
shortcomings of the analysis. In fact, many personal
characteristics, such as marital status and number of children
that would be included in academic studies of earnings, are
specifically excluded from earnings regressions in litigation
because these personal characteristics are not legally relevant.
Other reasons for excluding variables include that the variable at
question may itself be a product of the discriminatory treatment
at issue.99
The random error term, which is part of any regression
equation, encompasses the effects of variables not directly
included in the regression equation. Including more variables
may result in higher explanatory power of the regression
equation (what economists refer to as the R squared), but the
98. Barbara A. Norris, Multiple Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: A
Structural Approach to Attacks of “Missing Factors” and “Pre-Act
Discrimination,” 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 63 (1986).
99. See Trout v. Garrett, 780 F. Supp. 1396, 1412–13 (D.D.C. 1991)
Regression analyses are typically challenged on the basis that one or
more variables should be included or excluded because of their
appropriateness or lack thereof. One basis for excluding a variable as
“tainted” is that it gives a false explanation for the disparate impact.
A prime example of tainted variables are “status variables,” such as
job rank or grade level, which could reflect, at least in part, prior
discrimination. Baldus & Cole, Statistical Proof of Discrimination
§ 83 at 112–13 (1987 Supp.). If, for example, an individual’s grade
level is itself based on discrimination, then use of grade level as a
variable would falsely suggest that disparities in pay were
attributable to an objective factor rather than to the real source,
discrimination. In this Circuit, it is the law that a variable is to be
excluded if it is not demonstrated by clear, affirmative evidence that
it is based on neutral, objective factors, applied consistently.
Valentino v. United States Postal Service, 674 F.2d 56, 72 n.30 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); cf. Sobel v. Yeshiva University, 839 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1988).
One scholar has argued that tainted variables can still assist a court in
determining what type of decisions lead to disparities and in determining the
appropriate level of damages. See Srijati Ananda & Kevin Gilmartin, Inclusion
of Potentially Tainted Variables in Regression Analyses for Employment
Discrimination Cases, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 121, 151 (1991) (noting that tainted
variables can be helpful to achieve more accurate assessments of discrimination,
which can have “obvious relevance in the shaping of appropriate injunctive and
monetary relief”).
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only valid concern is whether failure to control for the alleged
omitted variable causes “omitted variable bias.” The practical
consequence of omitted variable bias in employment
discrimination cases is that the estimated regression equation
erroneously shows discrimination when in fact the omitted factor
is the legitimate and nondiscriminatory cause of the differential
employment outcome between the protected class and the
nonprotected class.100 In addition to not being a “tainted
variable,” two conditions must hold for the omitted variables to
cause the estimate of the coefficient of interest to be biased: the
omitted variable must be correlated with the variable that
represents the protected class at issue and the omitted variable
must have a statistically significant effect on the outcome.101
Often, the purported omitted variable will not have a statistically
significant effect on the outcome.102 The lack of an effect occurs
because it is not important or because it is correlated with
variables already included in the equation so that further
inclusion of a related variable is redundant and adds little to the
regression.103
For example, in Bazemore, if the primary omitted variable
raised by the defendant (job performance) was correlated with the
variable of interest (a variable indicating that the observation
was a black individual), if performance rating had a statistically
significant positive effect on pay, and if performance ratings were
not themselves discriminatorily assigned, then omitted variable
bias would result. If the omitted variable was negatively
correlated with race (meaning black individuals have worse job
performance), then its omission would bias the coefficient on the
variable of interest upwards because job performance is positively
correlated with wage; this bias would have meant that the
significant positive coefficient on the variable of interest (black)
may have been overstated. This bias would show a larger pay
disparity due to race than would appear in a regression analysis
100. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN
APPROACH 90–91 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining omitted variable biases).
101. See id. at 91 (discussing the effect of the omitted variable bias on
regression analyses).
102. See id. (noting that a small bias “need not be a cause for concern”).
103. See id. at 91–92 (discussing the effect of sample size and variable
correlation on a regression analysis).
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that also controlled for job performance. Alternatively, if black
individuals had better job performance, omission of job
performance would show a lower disparity in pay on the basis of
race.
In fact, in Bazemore, regressions that included job
performance showed a larger race disparity than regressions that
excluded this variable.104 The remaining additional variables
offered by the defendants to explain the observed pay disparity
referred to county-to-county differences in salary increases.105
However, unrebutted evidence showed that blacks were not
disproportionately located in counties that contributed only a
small amount to salary increases.106 That is, the so-called omitted
variables were not correlated with the variable of interest. Absent
a correlation between the so-called omitted factors and the
protected class, these omitted factors could not provide a raceneutral explanation for the pay disparity.107 The above discussion
is summarized in Takeaway One below.
Takeaway One: An omitted variable that will only affect the
results of a regression analysis establishes discrimination if
the omitted variable is correlated with the variable of interest
(likely an indicator variable for the individual being a member
of the protected class) and is itself a statistically significant
determinant of the outcome. Furthermore, many possible
variables are legitimately excluded because they are not
legally relevant, because they may themselves be the outcome
of the discriminatory treatment at issue, or because they are
adequately represented by variables already included in the
regression equation.

104. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 401 (1986). The pay disparity
was $475 as compared to the values discussed. Id. The regressions were not
presented at trial because performance ratings were missing from 20% of the
employment records. See id. at 401 n.11 (noting missing data).
105. Id. at 404 n.15 (noting missing variables related to county-to-county
differences).
106. See id. at 402 (“The United States presented evidence which it claims
respondents did not rebut, establishing that black employees were not located
disproportionately in the counties that contributed only a small amount to
Extension Service salaries.”).
107. See id. (“Absent a disproportionate concentration of blacks in such
counties, it is difficult, if not impossible to understand how the fact that some
counties contribute less to salaries than others could explain disparities
between black and white salaries.”).
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B. Sample Size

In over 62% of the cases gathered, the court notes potential
faults of the sample analyzed in the regression analyses. In these
cases, the court either notes that the sample analyzed was not
the sample that should have been analyzed, or the court notes
that the sample is too small to draw certain conclusions from the
case.108 However, for a regression analysis to be statistically
valid, the only requirement about sample size is that there are at
least as many observations as parameters in the regression
model.109 Sample size affects the power of the estimates—the
probability that a statistically significant effect, if true, can be
detected with the given sample size.110 Statistically significant
results are less likely when the sample size is small.111 As noted
by Daniel Rubinfeld,
Other things being equal, the statistical significance of a
regression coefficient increases as the sample size increases.
Thus, a $1 per hour wage differential between men and
women that was determined to be insignificantly different
from zero with a sample of 20 men and women could be highly
significant if the sample were increased to 200. 112

Valid conclusions can certainly be drawn from samples that are
not very large, and finding statistically significant effects in
108. Infra Appendix A.
109. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 100, at 167
For example, the unbiasedness of OLS (derived in Chapter 3) under
the first four Gauss-Markov assumptions is a finite sample property
because it holds for any sample size n (subject to the mild restriction
that n must be at least as large as the total number of parameters in
the regression model, k=1).
110. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 179, 192 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., 2d ed.
2000) (noting that a difference could be “statistically significant” if a large
enough sample is studied).
111. See id. (describing the possibility of obtaining results that are
“practically significant, but statistically insignificant,” particularly with small
sample sizes).
112. Id. Notably, Rubinfeld uses a sample size of twenty as a comparison to
a sample size of two hundred, which indicates that Rubinfeld considers a sample
size of twenty to be acceptable for a regression analysis, subject only to the
limitation that power is lower for a sample of twenty than for a sample of two
hundred.
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smaller sample sizes suggests that the estimated disparity is
large, not that the estimates are invalid.113 Confidence intervals
and tests of statistical significance take into account the sample
size and thus account for the greater variability in estimates that
arise from smaller sample sizes relative to larger sample sizes.114
The unimportance of sample size is further demonstrated
when the purpose of the regression analysis is not to draw
conclusions beyond the sample or the employer under
consideration. The regression analyses presented in employment
discrimination cases are not meant to be representative of the
entire U.S. population.115 Instead, these regressions are only
meant to establish whether that plaintiff was treated differently
than similarly situated coworkers due to his or her protected
class under a disparate treatment claim or that one of the
defendant’s policies had a disparate impact on members of a
protected class.116 Furthermore, the sample size is inherently
limited by the number of employees in a firm or, in the case of
discrimination in hiring, the records of applicants maintained by
the firm.117 Studies with similar goals and sample sizes as small
as twenty observations have been the basis of articles published
in reputable economic journals and often cited reports.118 It is
quite easy to find studies published in major economic journals
113. See id. at 191–92 (noting that even minor differences can be
statistically significant if a sufficiently large sample size is studied).
114. See id. at 192 (explaining that statistical significance is partially
determined by the sample size).
115. See Browne, supra note 34, at 506 (noting that comparisons between
the employer’s work force and the general population are not typically
appropriate).
116. See id. at 478 (describing disparate treatment claims and disparate
impact claims).
117. Note that Wal-Mart’s “tap on the shoulder” approach made it
impossible to assess whether promotions from within were representative of
applicants. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 148–49 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (describing the subjective factors involved in promotion and the “tap
on the shoulder” approach).
118. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 100, at 167 (referencing regressions with
samples sizes of twenty and seventy-two) (citing Ray C. Fair, Econometrics and
Presidential Elections, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 98 (1996)); Leslie A. Whittington,
James Alm & H. Elizabeth Peters, Fertility and the Personal Exemption:
Implicit Pronatalist Policy in the United States, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 545, 545
(1990).
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with sample sizes that would be deemed too “small” by an
opposing expert in an employment discrimination case.119
Unfortunately, opposing experts and judges often refute
regression analyses due to sample sizes that are of similar or
even far larger sizes based on nothing more than their assertion
that larger samples are required and without articulating any
scientific basis to support their claim.120
Reliable and strong conclusions can be drawn from small
samples, especially when the studies do not draw externally valid
conclusions, as is the case in the regression analyses presented in
employment discrimination cases. As a result, as long as the
plaintiff presents a regression analysis with a model that is
properly specified, its admittance into the courtroom or the
reliability of it should not be affected by sample size.
Takeaway Two: Sample size affects only the statistical power
and not the validity of the regression. Admissibility and
reliability of regression evidence should not be based on
sample size.

C. Statistical Significance
In close to 40% of the cases in our sample, the court notes a
discrepancy in statistical significance. The court either notes that
the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s experts drew conflicting
conclusions about statistical significance or recognizes the lack of
statistical significance of the variable of interest.121 Not
surprisingly, many courts require that results from a regression
analysis be statistically significant to draw conclusions from

119. See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and
Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 33 (2004) (reporting separate regressions
for jury trials and bench trials based on 119 jury trials and 54 bench trials in
Table Three); Joni Hersch, Alison F. Del Rossi & W. Kip Viscusi, Voter
Preferences and State Regulation of Smoking, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 455, 464–66
(2004) (reporting regressions results in Tables Six, Seven, and Eight based on
fifty states).
120. See, e.g., Coleman v. Exxon Chem. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d. 593, 618–19
(S.D. Tex. 2001) (finding that, although the sample size was not too small as a
matter of law, it was not sufficiently reliable to support the plaintiffs’ claims of
discrimination).
121. Infra Appendix A.
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them.122 Many courts also require statistical significance of the
results for regression analyses to enter the courtroom under
evidentiary standards.123 But courts have demonstrated a
fundamental confusion about what constitutes statistical
significance, and this confusion is easily and frequently exploited,
resulting in valid statistical evidence being deemed inadmissible.
There are three separate but related issues to consider in any
determination of statistical significance. First, what level of
significance is required? Second, should tests be one-sided or twosided? Third, has the regression specification been manipulated
to achieve a desired level of statistical significance?
Regarding the first issue, some courts adopt a bright-line
rule regarding the admissibility and reliance of regression results
due to statistical significance. These rules prevent the reliance on
data not significant at the 5% level (which in a two-sided test is a
p-value of .05 or approximately two standard deviations).124
However, as noted by the Northern District of Texas in Thomas v.
Deloitte Consulting, L.P.,125 most courts, including the Fifth
Circuit, have rejected such a bright-line standard.126 Even though
these courts reject a bright-line standard, the courts often
prevent analyses with results that fall short of the two standard
deviation requirement but are statistically significant at levels
recognized in academic research from entering the courtroom
under Daubert. In Thomas, the Northern District of Texas
122. See Thomas v. Deloitte Consulting L.P., No. 3-02-CV-0343-M, 2004 WL
1960097, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2004) (determining that a plaintiff may
establish a prima facie case by using statistics if a gross disparity that is
statistically significant is shown).
123. See id. at *5 (recognizing a bright-line rule for statistical significance
that prevents evidence not significant at a 5% level from entering the
courtroom).
124. See id. (citing several cases which established a bright-line rule of
either 5% statistical significance or two standard deviations).
125. No. 3-02-CV-0343-M, 2004 WL 1960097 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2004).
126. See id. at *5 (recognizing that the Second, Third, Seventh, Fifth, and
Eighth Circuits have rejected this bright-line standard and instead determine
the statistical significance of a result on a case-by-case basis). The court also
noted that the Fifth Circuit recognized in Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d
529, 544 (5th Cir. 1989), that statistical significance is dependent on sample
size, and the sample size varied with each analysis. Id. The Supreme Court has
not addressed this issue, and “most courts agree that there is no bright-line
test.” 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (2011–2012).
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recognized that “Daubert instructs that a court should consider
the known or potential rate of error when assessing the scientific
validity or reliability of expert testimony.”127 The court did not
allow the plaintiff’s expert to present regression results showing
a gender pay disparity that ranged between 7% and 10%
significance in a two-sided test of significance, which corresponds
to statistical significance in a one-sided test of 5%.128 The
following passage illustrates the court’s decision:
The court is unaware of any employment case where the jury
was allowed to consider statistical evidence of discrimination
that approached the 10% level used by Dr. Sobol. To the
contrary, “[s]tatisticians tend to discard chance as an
explanation for a result when deviations from the expected
value approach two standard deviations.” Payne v. Travenol
Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 821 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1038 (1982). Given the relatively small sample size
used by Dr. Sobol, the court has little difficulty in concluding
that a statistical deviation of 7% to 10% does not adequately
rule out that the alleged disparities identified in her report
were due to chance. As a result, Dr. Sobol will not be
permitted to offer testimony regarding the results of her
statistical analysis.129

The court supported this decision by citing several other Fifth
Circuit cases that required 5% significance (making it seem as if
the court applied a bright-line rule).130 It is common practice in
peer-reviewed research in economics to consider a result as
“statistically significant” when the result is significant at the 10%
level or less in a two-sided test.131 If courts use Daubert to remove
127. Thomas, 2004 WL 1960097, at *5 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. (citing E.E.O.C. v. Ethan Allan, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 625, 635–
36 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (requiring two standard deviations)); Elliot Grp. Med. &
Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215
(1984) (requiring a 5% level); Cooper v. Univ. of Tex. at Dall., 482 F. Supp. 187,
194 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff’d, 648 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring a 5% level).
131. Many studies published in major economic journals report results that
are significant at the 10% level for a two-sided test and discuss these results as
statistically significant. See Joni Hersch, Home Production and Wages: Evidence
from the American Time Use Survey, 7 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 159, 167 (2009)
(indicating levels of significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level); Joni Hersch & W.
Kip Viscusi, Immigrant Status and the Value of Statistical Life, 45 J. HUM. RES.
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results that are actually statistically significant, as the court did
in Thomas and as the courts that adopt a bright-line 5% standard
most certainly do, then valid and valuable evidence will not enter
the courtroom.
Second, courts rarely note whether the level of statistical
significance required is for a one-sided or two-sided hypothesis
test. In two 1977 decisions, the Supreme Court introduced the
notion that differences that correspond to “two or three standard
deviations” are in some way meaningful in supporting an
inference of discrimination.132 Even this vague reference to “two
or three standard deviations” reflects a fragile understanding of
the meaning of statistical significance. There is a vast difference
in the probability that a disparity of two standard deviations
occurs by chance and the probability that a disparity of three
standard deviations occurs by chance. Assuming we conduct twosided tests in a large sample, the probability that a disparity of
two standard deviations occurs by chance is 4.55%, but the
probability that a disparity of three standard deviations occurs by
chance is a mere 0.27%. In two-sided tests, the two standard
deviation criterion corresponds roughly to the 5% significance
level commonly accepted in statistics.133 The three standard
deviation criterion is well beyond a level of significance expected
in statistics. In fact, even the more stringent 1% level of
significance requires a standard deviation of only 2.56.134
In suggesting the two or three standard deviations criterion
for statistical significance, the Supreme Court was silent on
whether they anticipated the statistical tests to be one-sided,
meaning the test for discrimination examined whether the
protected class was treated worse than the nonprotected class, or
749, 758 (2010) (reporting results significant at the 5% and 10% level).
132. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (“As a general
rule for such large samples, if the difference between the expected value and the
observed number is greater than two or three standard deviations, then the
hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would be suspect to a social
scientist.”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17 (1977)
(“Because a fluctuation of more than two or three standard deviations would
undercut the hypothesis that decisions were being made randomly with respect
to race . . . .”).
133. The exact value in large samples is 1.96, not 2.
134. These statistics were calculated using Stata, based on the standard
normal distribution.
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two-sided, meaning the test for discrimination is simply that one
party is treated differently than the other with no hypothesis
about which party is preferred.135 That cases of discrimination
reach the courts with ambiguity about which party is the victim
of alleged discrimination seems implausible, and some courts
have recognized this absurdity.136 The distinction between onesided and two-sided tests is often crucial.137 In a one-sided test,
the 5% level of significance is reached with 1.645 standard
deviations. In a two-sided test, the 5% level is reached with 1.96
standard deviations.138 However, both the level of significance
and whether the hypotheses tests must be one-sided or two-sided
(also referred to as “one-tailed” and “two-tailed”) determine
whether any given result is “statistically significant.”139 As Daniel
Rubinfeld writes in a federal court guide to regression analyses:

135. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496 n.17 (identifying that a difference
greater than two or three standard deviations is suspect, but not identifying
whether the test was one-sided); Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 311 n.17
(noting that fluctuations of more than two or three standard deviations do not
support claims that decisions were made randomly, but failing to identify
whether the tests were one-sided); see also Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F. 2d 84, 92
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the Supreme Court has not provided explicit
guidance on the issue of one-tailed or two-tailed approaches).
136. See Palmer, 815 F.2d at 95 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that claims of
alleged discrimination involved complaints about both under- and overselection, and that “statistically significant deviations in either direction from
an equality in selection rates would constitute a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination” possibly leading to confusion about which party is the victim of
discrimination).
137. See Rubinfeld, Reference Guide, supra note 110, at 195 (noting that the
choice of either a one- or two-tailed test may affect an expert’s acceptance or
rejection of a null hypothesis).
138. This is explained clearly in Palmer v. Schultz:
How can a 5% probability of randomness correspond both to a
measurement of two standard deviations and a measurement of 1.65
standard deviations, one may reasonably ask? There is a legitimate
answer: it depends on whether one is using a “one-tailed” or a
“two-tailed” test of statistical significance. A disparity measuring 1.65
standard deviations corresponds to a 5% probability of randomness
under a one-tailed test. A disparity measuring two standard
deviations (to be more precise, 1.96 standard deviations) corresponds
to a 5% probability of randomness under a two-tailed test.
Palmer, 815 F.2d at 92.
139. See id. at 93 (explaining that a number’s statistical significance varies
depending on whether a one-tailed or two-tailed test is used).
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When the expert evaluates the null hypothesis that a variable
of interest has no association with a dependent variable
against the alternative hypothesis that there is an association,
a two-tailed test, which allows for the effect to be either
positive or negative, is usually appropriate. A one-tailed test
would usually be applied when the expert believes, perhaps on
the basis of other direct evidence presented at trial, that the
alternative hypothesis is either positive or negative, but not
both. For example, an expert might use a one-tailed test in a
patent infringement case if he or she strongly believes that the
effect of the alleged infringement on the price of the infringed
product was either zero or negative.140

The third issue that courts often misunderstand is that, by
adding additional explanatory variables that may or may not be
relevant, statistical significance can often easily be manipulated
to tip the level of significance below any purported cutoff value.
In Cason v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp.,141 by adding in an
additional sixty-seven variables to indicate month-year that a
loan was made, the defendant was able to drive a p-value from
.073 (statistically significant at the 5% level in a one-sided test) to
.107, even though as a group, these additional sixty-seven monthyear variables were statistically irrelevant.142
Courts also decrease the reliance of regression results when
they misinterpret other measures of statistical significance. For
example, in Sears, the Seventh Circuit correctly referred to zvalues as the “number of standard deviations between the actual
and expected figures.”143 The court, however, then referred to a zvalue of 3.6 as “barely statistically significant” and a z-value of
2.9 as “less than statistically significant.”144 In reality, z-values of
3.6 and 2.9 are equivalent to p-values of less than .001 in a

140. See Rubinfeld, Reference Guide, supra note 110, at 194.
141. 28 F. App’x 392, 394 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-6483) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
142. Expert Report for Plaintiff, Supplemental Report on Racial Impact of
NMAC’s Finance Charge Markup Policy at 45, Cason v. Nissan Motor
Acceptance Corp., 28 F. App'x 392, 394 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-6483) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). We calculated the F-statistic from
these reports to independently determine the additional variables were
statistically insignificant.
143. E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 323 (7th Cir. 1988).
144. Id. at 335–36.
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standard normal distribution.145 As a result, these z-values of 3.6
and 2.9 easily reach the standard for statistical significance
(instead of being “barely statistically significant”) at the 5% level
in both one-sided and two-sided tests.146
One scholar has suggested that experts simply present pvalues, instead of using the term “statistically significant,” so
that the jury can decide whether the statistical evidence is
reliable.147 This argument has some merit because the defendants
would then be able to present evidence arguing that the level of
significance is below any reasonable standard of reliability.148
However, due to general concerns with the presentation of expert
testimony (as discussed in Part II.B, supra), the court may want
to use its gatekeeping role under Daubert to keep out results that
do not meet the level of significance typically reported as
meaningful in peer-reviewed publications—significance at the
10% level.
Takeaway Three: Employment discrimination tests should
always be one-sided tests and results that are significant at
the 10% level should always be considered “statistically
significant.”

IV. A Statistical Analysis of Econometrics in the Courtroom
As illustrated above, regression analyses often provide
critical evidence in employment discrimination claims, but the
evidence can quickly be diminished by the opposing party’s often
145. See DEP’T OF STATISTICS, TEX. A&M UNIV., STANDARD NORMAL
DISTRIBUTION, https://www.stat.tamu.edu/~lzhou/stat302/standardnormaltable.p
df (listing p-values for a range of z-values).
146. See Tests of Significance, YALE UNIV. DEP’T OF STATISTICS,
http://www.stat.yale.edu/Courses/1997-98/101/sigtest.htm (last visited Nov. 18,
2014) (describing significance levels for p-values at various percent levels) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
147. See D. H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH.
L. REV. 1333, 1339–40 (1986) (“As to the finding’s admissibility, the issue is
whether the testimony that the numbers are ‘significant’ sufficiently advances
the understanding of the trier of fact to be worth the effort consumed in its
presentation and explanation.”).
148. See id. at 1344–45 (noting that statistical significance at the .05 level
does not objectively prove a proposition as true and that “[s]tatistical evidence
need not be dispositive to be helpful in building a prima facie case”).
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invalid critiques. While anecdotal and theoretical evidence of this
problem is very persuasive, statistical evidence could inform the
extent of the problem. We gathered a sample of employment
discrimination cases in which one of the parties (generally the
plaintiff) presented regression analyses with the hope of gaining
more insight into the problem through sample statistics and our
own regression analyses. We hoped to answer the following
questions: (1) Do plaintiffs who present regression analyses in the
sample of employment discrimination cases benefit from the
evidence? (2) Is the value of the evidence diminished if the
opposing party also presents regression analyses? (3) How often
does the court acknowledge an opposing party’s critiques of the
regression analyses? And (4) does the acknowledgment of those
critiques further negate the introduction of the analyses?
A. Data
To answer each of the above questions, we searched for all
Title VII employment discrimination federal court decisions
available on Westlaw since 2000 that mention “regression
analysis.” Specifically, we limited the Westlaw search to Title VII
cases published between January 2000 and October 2013
containing the words “regression analysis.” This search resulted
in a sample of seventy-eight cases.149 The citations to each case
are listed in Table A of the Appendix. Because this sample was
gathered from a Westlaw search, this analysis does not represent
all employment discrimination cases in which plaintiffs presented
regression analyses; however, we believe it still provides valuable
information about how courts and juries address the introduction
of regression analyses in employment discrimination cases. The
total sample is comprised of summary judgment motions,
evidentiary motions, trial verdicts, and both district court and
court of appeals opinions.
After reading each decision, we coded the following
characteristics of the case: whether it was a class action; the type
of discrimination claim made; whether the EEOC represented the
charging party; and whether a disparate impact claim was made.
149. See supra note 95 (discussing the Westlaw search and the resulting
sample).
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Most importantly, we noted the outcome of the motion or trial,
and we noted which parties presented regression analyses
supporting their claims. The result of the claim was coded as the
result reported in the opinion being analyzed. We then coded
whether the result was favorable for the plaintiff or the
defendant. For example, if the motion to exclude the plaintiff’s
statistical evidence was denied, then the result was coded as
being in favor of the plaintiff. On the other hand, if the motion
was granted, then the result was coded as being in favor of the
defendant.150 Many of these evidentiary motions are not followed
by trials with published opinions (as the case might have been
settled or the opinion not published). As a result, the final
outcome of the case is not necessarily the outcome that we
analyzed.
B. General Summary Statistics
In a 1991 study, Catherine Connolly analyzed forty
employment discrimination cases in which one of the parties
presented regression analysis.151 Connolly found that plaintiffs
who presented regression analyses were most likely to prevail
when both parties presented regression analyses, but that the
plaintiff only prevailed 52.5% of the time.152 Connolly also found
that the plaintiffs did not receive a comparative advantage when
they were the only party to submit regression analyses.153 In
addition, Connolly compared the plaintiff’s highest chance of
winning (52.5%) to previous estimations of a plaintiff’s chance of
prevailing in an employment discrimination case (or motion),
150. Occasionally, multiple motions are addressed in one opinion with some
in favor of the defendant and some in favor of the plaintiff. These opinions were
also coded as in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant. For example if both
parties’ motions to bar expert evidence were denied, and the class was certified,
the opinion was coded as in the plaintiffs’ favor.
151. See Catherine Connolly, The Use of a Multiple Regression Analysis in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 10 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 117, 123
(1991) (noting that in twenty of those cases, both parties presented regression
analysis; in twelve cases, only the plaintiff presented a regression; and in eight
cases, only the defendant presented a regression).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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which ranged from 31%–58%.154 This comparison suggested that,
as of 1991, presenting a regression analysis did not increase the
plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing, which, assuming the
regressions were valid, it should.155 For a first look at our sample,
we computed statistics similar to Connolly’s statistics.
In our sample, the plaintiff presented a regression in all but
four of the seventy-eight cases (94.87%). In addition, the plaintiff
was the only party to present a regression in 51.28% of the cases,
and the defendant was the only party to present a regression in
only 5.13% of the cases.156 These statistics are not surprising
because, as Connolly recognized as well, the plaintiff has the
burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and, in
the absence of direct evidence, the plaintiff must submit
circumstantial evidence (including statistical evidence) to
establish a rebuttable prima facie case.157 In fact, “[s]tatistical
evidence is indispensable to a claim of disparate impact because
the claim is that the challenged practice has an adverse effect on
a group, not merely on an individual,”158 and as a result, 66.67%
of the sample presented a disparate impact claim. Also, as
discussed in Part II, plaintiffs frequently (even after Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes) use regression analyses to establish class
154. Id. at 122 (citing Paul Burstein, Attacking Sex Discrimination in the
Labor Market: A Study in Law and Politics, 67 SOC. FORCES 641, 657 (1989)).
However, the plaintiff was at a disadvantage when the plaintiff did not present
a regression and the defendant did. Id. at 123.
155. See id. at 122–23 (noting that plaintiffs had success between 31%–58%
of the time with or without the use of regression analysis).
156. It was not clear in every reported opinion whether the defendant
presented a regression analysis. If it was not clear that the defendant did not
present a regression analysis, then it was assumed that the defendant did not
present such results.
157. See Connolly, supra note 151, at 122 (“The more extensive use of
regression analysis by plaintiffs may reflect the ordering of the burden of proof
in an employment discrimination case.”). Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, the plaintiff generally must establish that: “(i) he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) he applied and was qualified for a job the employer was trying to
fill; (iii) though qualified, he was rejected; and (iv) thereafter the employer
continued to seek applicants with complainant’s qualifications.” 411 U.S. 792,
792–93 (1973). Plaintiffs often present statistical evidence to meet and
strengthen requirement (iii); however, courts have recognized that statistical
evidence alone is not enough, and, as a result, 94% of the sample also presented
anecdotal evidence. Browne, supra note 34, at 481.
158. Browne, supra note 34, at 479.
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commonality, and over 75% of our sample involved a class
action.159 Regression analyses are also the “core” of pattern or
practice claims, which generally underlie class action cases.160
Table 1 presents these summary statistics.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Characteristic

Percent of Cases
with Characteristic
Plaintiff Only Party to Present Regression
51.28% (40)
Defendant Only Party to Present Regression
5.13% (4)
Plaintiff & Defendant Present Regression
43.59% (34)
Class Action
76.92% (60)
EEOC Representation
6.41% (5)
Disparate Impact Claim Made
66.67% (52)
Disparate Impact Was the Only Claim Made
23.08% (18)
This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title VII
cases in which a party submitted a regression analysis. These cases
were decided during January 2000–October 2013. The number of cases
analyzed is seventy-eight. The number of cases with each
characteristic is indicated in parentheses.

Nielsen et al. analyzed the outcome of a sample of
employment discrimination cases filed in federal court during
1988 to 2003.161 Their study reported that 6% of the employment
discrimination cases they analyzed went to trial, and, of those
6%, the plaintiffs won 33% of the time.162 In addition, of those
cases that went to summary judgment, the plaintiffs prevailed
approximately 43% of the time.163 Nielsen et al.’s sample
represents a broader sample than the sample analyzed in this
Article, which is limited to cases in which regression analysis is
presented. In our sample, the plaintiff wins 41.03% of the time.
159. See id. at 478–79 (describing the role of statistical evidence in a class
action or pattern-or-practice case).
160. See Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 2000) (“In a pattern and
practice disparate treatment case, statistical evidence constitutes the core of a
plaintiff's prima facie case.”).
161. Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Individual
Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation
in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 181
(2010).
162. Id. at 187.
163. Id. at 184.
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Unlike in Connolly’s sample,164 in our sample, the plaintiff is
most likely to win if they are the only party to present a
regression (55%) and that percentage falls to 23.53% when the
defendant also introduces a regression.165 These percentages are
presented in Table 2. When comparing these percentages to those
presented in Nielsen et al., the plaintiff is actually at a
comparative disadvantage when both parties present a regression
analysis, as the plaintiff prevailed between 33%–43% in Nielsen’s
sample.166 In addition, the plaintiff only gains a small
comparative advantage when they are the only party to present a
regression (55%).
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Plaintiff Result
Characteristic

Percent of Cases
with
Plaintiff Result
Plaintiff Only Party to Present Regression
55.00% (22/40)
Defendant Only Party to Present Regression
50.00% (2/4)
Plaintiff & Defendant Present Regression
23.53% (8/34)
This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title VII
cases in which a party submitted a regression analysis. These cases
were decided during January 2000–October 2013. The number of cases
analyzed is seventy-eight. The number of cases with plaintiff result out
of the total number of cases with the characteristic is indicated in
parentheses.

C. Statistical Findings Related to the Three Critiques
Assuming that the plaintiff presented a valid regression
showing that the plaintiff was disadvantaged due to being a
member of a protected class, the regression analysis should, on
average, increase the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing over the
164. Connolly, supra note 151, at 123.
165. Strangely, in our sample, the plaintiff wins 50% of the time when the
defendant is the only party to present a regression. This sample is very small
(n=4).
166. Nielsen et al., supra note 161, at 184. Our sample is not directly
comparable to Nielsen et al. because this sample is limited to those with
regression analysis and because the sample includes the outcomes of
evidentiary motions in addition to the outcomes of trials and summary
judgment motions. Our sample is also limited to reported cases.
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defendant.167 However, as evidenced by Connolly (1991) and by
the updated analysis presented here, this increase does not
actually occur.168 This is likely because the defendant, even when
not presenting a regression analysis, challenges the validity of
the plaintiff’s regression analysis by challenging the statistical
methods used.169 These challenges are usually based on the
econometric critiques discussed above (omitted variables, sample
size, and statistical significance).170 In almost 90% of the cases
analyzed, the court or opposing expert mentions at least one of
these critiques.171
Table 3 presents summary statistics that show how often
three econometric critiques are mentioned in the published
opinions of our sample. These critiques were the three most
common critiques mentioned by the court: omitted variables,
inadequate sample, and a lack of statistical significance. As
discussed above, these critiques are only valid in certain
circumstances.172 The statistics presented in Table 3 are limited
to the cases where the plaintiff submitted a regression analysis,
as our analysis focused on whether the plaintiff benefits by
presenting such statistics in Title VII cases. We coded these
167. See supra Part II.B (discussing the incentives for the plaintiff to
present a valid regression analysis).
168. See Connolly, supra note 151, at 122–23 (noting that the plaintiff has a
similar probability of prevailing over the defendant with or without the use of
regression analysis).
169. See id. at 123 (“Defendants . . . often successfully argue that the
plaintiffs’ computer print outs, mathematical equations, and university experts
present a distorted view of the work environment. These defendants argue that
personnel policies and practices are far too complicated to be reduced to a
statistical showing.”).
170. See supra Part III (analyzing three common econometric critiques).
171. Infra Table 3. If the court in any way referenced the regression analysis
not including every relevant variable, we coded the opinion as referencing
omitted variables. If the court in any way referenced the regression analysis not
analyzing the correct sample or analyzing a sample that was too small, we coded
the opinion as referencing critiques associated with the sample. If the court in
any way mentioned that the regression results were not statistically significant
or the fact that the opposing party challenged the level of significance, we coded
the opinion as referencing statistical significance. Even if the court correctly
analyzed these critiques, we still coded the court as referencing the critique in
the opinion.
172. See supra Part III (discussing the validity of the three common
econometric critiques).
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critiques as present in an opinion regardless of whether the court
or opposing expert correctly analyzed them.173 Table 3 shows that
the court discussed omitted variables in 63.51% of the cases. In
addition, the court mentioned critiques associated with the
sample (whether it was the correct sample or whether it was too
small) in 62.16% of the cases, and the court mentioned critiques
associated with statistical significance in 39.19% of the cases.
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Econometric Critiques
Econometric Critique

Percent of Cases Presented

Omitted Variables

63.51% (47)

Sample

62.16% (46)

Statistical Significance

39.19% (29)

Any Critique

89.19% (66)

This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title VII
cases. We exclude the four cases in which only the defendant presented
a regression analysis. These cases were decided during January 2000–
October 2013. The number of cases analyzed is seventy-four. The
number of cases with the econometric critique is indicated in
parentheses.

Table 4 presents summary statistics illustrating how often
the plaintiff received a favorable result in opinions where the
plaintiff presented a regression analysis and the court mentioned
any of the three econometric critiques summarized in Table 3. As
Table 4 illustrates, when the plaintiff presents regression results
and any critique is mentioned, the plaintiff wins in 36.36% of the
cases. This percentage is less than the percent of the total sample
that wins when the plaintiff presents a regression analysis
(40.54%).174 In addition, the percentage of plaintiff verdicts is
even smaller when omitted variables are discussed (31.91%).
173. In many cases, we could not discern whether the court correctly
analyzed the critique or whether the critique was valid because we only had the
published opinion available.
174. See supra Table 2 (obtaining this statistic from the total number of
plaintiff results in this study, or 31/78).
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Plaintiff Result when Econometric
Critique Discussed
Econometric Critique
Present of Cases With Plaintiff
Result
Omitted Variables

31.91% (15/47)

Sample

39.13% (18/46)

Statistical Significance

37.93% (11/29)

Any Critique

36.36% (24/66)

This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title VII
cases. This data is limited to cases in which the plaintiff submitted a
regression analysis. We exclude the four cases in which only the
defendant presented a regression analysis. These cases were decided
during January 2000–October 2013. The number of cases analyzed is
seventy-four. The number of cases with plaintiff result out of the
total number of cases with the econometric critique is indicated in
parentheses.

Because contradictory statistics are not presented, a plaintiff
should benefit most from presenting regression analyses when
the plaintiff is the only party to present such statistical evidence.
Table 2 illustrated that plaintiffs were more likely to receive a
favorable result in cases with regression analyses when they were
the only party to present such analyses. Table 5 presents
summary statistics that show how often the court mentions
econometric critiques even when the defendant does not present a
regression analysis. As a result, Table 5 is limited to cases in
which the plaintiff is the only party to present regression
analyses. Comparing the second column of Table 5 to the
statistics in Table 3 illustrates that the court is slightly less likely
(82.50% compared to 89.19%) to discuss econometric critiques
when the plaintiff is the only party to present a regression
analysis. The third column of Table 5 shows that even when the
plaintiff is the only party to present a regression analysis, the
plaintiff has a smaller chance of winning when any critique is
presented (48.48%) as compared to the total sample of plaintiffs
that prevail when the plaintiff is the only party to present a
regression analysis (55%). Not surprisingly, the percentages
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reported in column three of Table 5 are larger than those
presented in Table 4 because the plaintiff is more likely to receive
a favorable result when the plaintiff is the only party to present a
regression analysis.
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Plaintiff Result when Plaintiff is the
Only Party to Present Regressions and Critique is Presented
Critique

Percent of Cases
Presented

Present of Cases
With Plaintiff
Result

Omitted Variables

57.50% (23)

43.48% (10/23)

Sample Size

55.00% (22)

50.00% (11/22)

Statistical
Significance

40.00% (16)

37.50% (6/16)

Any Critique

82.50% (33)

48.48% (16/33)

This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title VII
cases. This data is limited to cases in which the plaintiff is the only
party to submit a regression analysis. We exclude the four cases in
which only the defendant presented a regression analysis. These cases
were decided during January 2000–October 2013. The number of
cases analyzed is forty. In the second column, the number of cases in
which the critique is presented is reported in parentheses. In the third
column, the number of cases with a plaintiff result out of the total
number of cases in which the critique is presented is reported in
parentheses.

D. Regression Results
To determine more accurately the consequences of an
opposing party presenting contradicting regression analyses and
critiques of the plaintiff’s analysis, we conducted our own
regression analyses. Each regression controls for major
characteristics that we believe may affect the outcome of an
employment discrimination case. In each analysis, the dependent
variable is the outcome of the case or motion, and each regression
controls for major characteristics that we believe may affect the
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outcome of an employment discrimination case. These
characteristics are whether the case is a class action and whether
the plaintiff was represented by the EEOC. We believe that
plaintiffs in these cases may present more statistical evidence,
which may affect the likelihood that the defendant challenges
that evidence. In addition, the specifications control for whether
the party presented only a disparate impact claim, as opposed to
a disparate treatment claim or both claims, which may affect the
likelihood that they prevail.
The variables of interest in our regression analysis are
whether the defendant presented a regression and whether the
reported opinion mentioned any of the discussed critiques. The
dependent variable is whether the plaintiff received a favorable
outcome, either at trial, from a summary judgment motion, from
an evidentiary motion, or from a class action certification. Our
regression analysis analyzes the seventy-four cases in which the
plaintiff presented a regression analysis, as we are interested in
the defendant challenging those regressions. The results of the
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression are reported in Table 6
and show that, if the defendant presents a regression, the
plaintiff is 28.8 percentage points less likely to have a favorable
result. In addition, if the opinion mentions any of the econometric
critiques (omitted variables, statistical significance, or sample
deficiencies), then the plaintiff is 28.8 percentage points less
likely to have a favorable result. Both of these results are
significant at the 5% level in a two-sided test.175

175.
court.

As a result, this evidence should be submitted to a jury if presented in
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Table 6: OLS Regression Results: Dependent Variable Plaintiff Result
Variable

Coefficient

Any Critique Present

-0.288**
(0.117)

Defendant Presented
Regression

-0.288**
(0.136)

Class Action

0.191
(0.128)

EEOC

-0.465***
(0.134)

Disparate Impact Claim
Only

-0.038
(0.140)

Constant

0.682***
(0.154)

Number of Observations

74

This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title
VII cases in which the plaintiff submitted a regression analysis.
These cases were decided during January 2000–October 2013.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels in a two-sided
test, respectively.

Table 7 presents results of a regression analysis that is
limited to cases in which the plaintiff is the only party to submit
regression analysis as evidence. Because of our sample
construction, this regression does not control for whether the
defendant presented a regression. These results show that the
plaintiff is even more disadvantaged by critiques being discussed
in an opinion when they are the only party to present a
regression, as they are 36.0 percentage points less likely to
receive a favorable result.
Although these results are limited because the sample is
comprised only of cases and motions with published opinions,
these results do show that the plaintiff is disadvantaged when
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econometric critiques, which may actually be flawed, are
presented in court. Due to this strong result, this Article stresses
the importance of the court exercising its gatekeeping role under
Daubert in response to these critiques being presented. It also
stresses the importance of the court and of the experts having an
understanding of when these econometric critiques are actually
invalid.
Table 7: OLS Regression Results for Cases Where Plaintiff is the Only
Party to Present Regression Results: Dependent Variable Plaintiff Result
Variable

Coefficient

Any Critique Present

-0.360***
(0.111)

Class Action

0.208
(0.164)

EEOC

-0.703***
(0.227)

Disparate Impact
Claim Only

-0.344
(0.206)

Constant

0.779***
(0.157)

Number of
Observations

40

This sample was gathered from a Westlaw search limited to Title VII
cases in which the plaintiff submitted a regression analysis. These
cases were decided during January 2000–October 2013. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels in a two-sided test,
respectively.
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V. Examples of the Use and Misuse of Econometrics in Our
Sample
The following examples from our sample of cases illustrate
how the court has recently acknowledged the three critiques that
were most often discussed in our sample. These examples show
that the court is capable of correctly recognizing when the
critiques are valid, but they also provide examples of how invalid
critiques can lead the court astray.
A. Omitted Variables Examples
In Sears, the Northern District of Illinois completely
misstated omitted variable bias: “However, the sex coefficient
reflects not only the effect of sex, but also the residual effect of
any factor which affects salary that is not included in the model.
Thus, if important variables are omitted, the effect of sex on
compensation estimated by the model will be artificially
inflated.”176 Unfortunately, even after Bazemore, courts and
opposing experts mischaracterize omitted variable bias and often
do not focus on whether omitted variable bias is present in a
regression. Instead, courts simply focus on the fact that variables
that may explain part of the dependent variable are absent.177 In
addition, courts continue to allow defendants to present these
arguments to the jury.178 Within our sample of cases, there are
examples of courts generally discussing omitted variables as a
potential problem, as well as examples of the court incorrectly
characterizing the problem. There are also examples of the courts
correctly applying Bazemore and correctly recognizing when
omitting certain variables is not an issue.
A more recent example of a court generally discussing the
problem is the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s discussion in
Morgan v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc.179 To establish
176. E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1344 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 159 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (recognizing defendant’s omitted variables critique).
179. 143 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1151 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
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race discrimination in wages, the plaintiff’s expert presented a
regression that controlled for the previous two performance
evaluations but did not control for every performance
evaluation.180 When the opposing expert controlled for each
evaluation in the regression, the coefficient on the variable
indicating that the individual was black became insignificant.181
The large increase in the number of variables within the equation
(every evaluation instead of two) alone can result in lower
statistical significance of explanatory variables.182 However, this
alternative explanation was never presented to the judge and
never mentioned in the opinion. Even though the opposing expert
did not show that these additional evaluations were negatively
correlated with race and positively correlated with wage, nor did
the expert show that taken as a group the additional explanatory
variables resulted in a statistically significant improvement in
explanatory power rather than merely a successful ruse to
eliminate statistical significance in the original regression, the
court concluded that the additional variables should be included
in the regression and that the wage disparity between black and
white managers was due to factors other than race.183
There are additional examples in our sample where a court
accepted the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s regression
is flawed due to omitted variables without requiring that the
defendant establish the relationships discussed in Takeaway
One.184 In Carpenter v. Boeing Co.,185 the defendant, Boeing,
argued that the plaintiff’s study did not “show that the
‘something’ causing men to work more overtime than women is
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text (noting that increasing
the number of variables can manipulate the statistical significance).
183. See Morgan, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1151–52 (finding that the defendant’s
expert properly included the additional variables and noting that the plaintiffs
presented insufficient evidence to provide a basis for excluding the additional
variables).
184. See, e.g., Franklin v. Local 2 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 565
F.3d 508, 518 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding the plaintiffs’ statistical analysis
unreliable because of omitted variables); Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d
1183, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing the omitted variable as a flaw in the
plaintiffs’ regression analysis).
185. 456 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2006).
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the manager discretion that Plaintiffs have identified as the
challenged employment practice” due to an omitted variable.186
While the Tenth Circuit discussed the relationships that the
omitted variable (department assignment) had with the outcome
(overtime hours) and with the variable of interest (the protected
class, in this case, female), it did not require the defendant to
prove those relationships statistically or to prove that the
inclusion of the variable affected the significance of the result.187
The court upheld the lower court’s decision denying class
certification, in part, because of the flaws associated with the
statistical analysis.188
In Franklin v. Local 2 of the Sheet Metal Workers
International Association,189 the Eighth Circuit reviewed the
lower court’s holding that “Dr. Gutman’s report [was] not reliable
because of the assumptions he m[ade], unsupported conclusions
he dr[ew], and variables he fail[ed] to consider in rendering his
opinion.”190 While the Eighth Circuit did discuss certain
important relationships with the claimed omitted variables, it
also quoted an earlier decision:
The burden is on the opposing party to clearly rebut statistical
evidence; hypotheses or conjecture will not suffice. When a
plaintiff submits accurate statistical data, and a defendant
alleges that relevant variables are excluded, defendant may
not rely on hypothesis to lessen the probative value of
plaintiff’s statistical proof. Rather, defendant, in his rebuttal
presentation, must either rework plaintiff's statistics
incorporating the omitted factors or present other proof
undermining plaintiff's claims.191

While this quote may seem to be in line with Takeaway One, as it
requires some form of statistical proof that the variables are
relevant, reworking the regression with the omitted variables
186. Id. at 1196.
187. See id. at 1195–96 (analyzing the experts’ statistical findings).
188. See id. at 1203–04 (discussing the court’s reasoning for finding the
plaintiffs’ statistical analysis deficient).
189. 565 F.3d 508 (8th Cir. 2009).
190. Id. at 514 (alternations in original) (quoting Franklin v. Sheet Metal
Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 2, No. 06-0004-CV-W-GAF, 2008 WL
2819372, at *3 (W.D. Mo. July 8, 2008)).
191. Id. at 517 (quoting Coble v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 6, 682 F.2d 721,
730 (8th Cir. 1982)).
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does not establish each of the required relationships; even if the
variable of interest is no longer significant, the relationship with
the omitted variable and the variable of interest is not proven.192
In addition, an increase in the number of variables within the
equation alone can result in lower statistical significance of
explanatory variables.193
Fortunately, there are also examples in our sample of cases
correctly applying Bazemore and not allowing claims of omitted
variables to preclude the introduction of valid statistical evidence
in employment discrimination cases. In Derrickson v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc.,194 the District of Maryland denied the defendant’s
motions for summary judgment and to exclude the plaintiff’s
expert report.195 The plaintiff’s expert report included results of a
regression analysis that showed statistical disparities in
promotion rates because of race.196 The defendants sought to
exclude the report, arguing that the regressions were flawed
because they failed to control for store location.197 The court then
correctly cited Bazemore and denied the motion to exclude.198 In
fact, the court also correctly recognized that the plaintiff’s expert
did include store location in some regressions and found
promotional differences that were statistically insignificant only
due to sample size.199 This discussion showed that the court
understood the elements of Takeaway One and Takeaway Two,
discussed below.
192. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing the required
relationships).
193. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text (noting that increasing
the number of variables can manipulate the statistical significance).
194. 84 F. Supp. 2d 679 (D. Md. 2000).
195. See id. at 689–90 (denying the motions related to the defendant’s
challenge of statistical evidence offered to demonstrate employment
discrimination).
196. Id. at 689.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 689–90 (noting that omission of a variable does not
automatically render “an analysis which accounts for the major factors . . .
unacceptable as evidence of discrimination” (quoting Bazemore v. Friday, 478
U.S. 385, 402 (1986))).
199. See id. at 690 (“Finally, Dr. Medoff did run the regression analysis to
include store location as a variable and still found promotional differences to
exist favoring whites. However, because the location variable reduced the
sample sizes, many of the results were statistically insignificant.”).
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In Lavin-McEleney v. Marist College,200 the Second Circuit
also got it right when a defendant presented similar challenges to
the plaintiff’s statistical evidence.201 In Marist College, the
plaintiff presented regression analyses to support a claim of sex
discrimination in wages.202 These regressions controlled for
characteristics that could influence each professor’s wage
separately from his or her sex.203 These characteristics included
each professor’s rank, years of service, division, tenure status,
and degrees earned.204 Even after controlling for these variables,
the coefficient for female was negative and significant, indicating
statistically significant lower salaries for female employees.205 As
the Second Circuit recognized, the lower court properly admitted
this statistical evidence despite the defendant’s objections.206
Also, despite the defendant’s expert’s contention that
counterparts should only be compared on a departmental basis,
the plaintiff’s results were presented to the jury (as were the
defendant’s results that showed an insignificant gender-pay
disparity).207 Ultimately, the jury found that this evidence and
additional anecdotal evidence supported a valid claim under the
Equal Pay Act.208 As a result, the district court awarded the
plaintiff back pay and attorney’s fees.209

200. 239 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2001).
201. See id. at 478–79 (explaining the defendant’s objection to the plaintiff’s
statistical findings).
202. Id. at 478.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 482 (holding that the plaintiff’s regression analysis “properly
supported plaintiff’s case and was appropriately employed to calculate
damages”).
207. Id. at 478–79.
208. See id. at 479 (“The jury found for the plaintiff on the Equal Pay Act
claim, but decided that Marist’s violation of the Act was not willful.”). The
special verdict form “instructed the jury not to consider plaintiff’s Title VII
violation if it found that Marist’s violation of the Equal Pay Act was not willful.”
Id. Accordingly, “the jury did not find Marist liable on plaintiff’s Title VII
claim.” Id.
209. See id. (noting the district court’s decision to amend the judgment in
the plaintiff’s favor and award her back pay, attorney’s fees, liquidated
damages, and costs).
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In Tabor v. Hilti, Inc.,210 the most recent case in our sample,
the court correctly analyzed omitted variable bias and almost
directly addressed the points discussed in Takeaway One.211
Although the Northern District of Oklahoma ultimately found for
the defendant on the disparate impact claim of gender
discrimination, the court correctly rejected the defendant’s
arguments challenging the plaintiff’s regression analyses.212 The
court concluded as a matter of law that the failure to include
priority ratings in the regression analysis did not render the
regressions unreliable or unsound because the regressions
“controlled for important variables other than sex that could
impact promotion rates.”213 In fact, the court followed that finding
with an even more detailed conclusion:
Dr. Killingsworth’s decision to not control for SMD mobility
ratings does not render his analysis unreliable. In a regression
analysis, mobility preferences would only change the
statistical significance of the sex variable if mobility
preferences differed by sex. However, Hilti provides no
trustworthy data demonstrating that the mobility preferences
of women differ from men among Base Market employees.
Because the court may not presume such differences, the
failure to control for mobility preferences does not make Dr.
Killingsworth’s analysis unreliable.214

This conclusion almost directly restates Takeaway One, showing
that perhaps some courts are aware of the false critiques that
expert witnesses present when attempting to impugn the
reliability of valid statistical evidence presented by plaintiffs.
While it remains routine for defendants to attempt to refute
regression analyses by claiming that omitted variables cause the
illegal disparities, experts and judges must remember (as some
courts in our sample have) that omitting variables that are
expected to affect the dependent variable does not always lead to
210. No. 09-cv-189-GKF-PJC, 2013 WL 4068781 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 12, 2013).
211. See id. at *9 (analyzing the plaintiff’s expert’s findings and noting that
the omitted variable “does not render his analysis unreliable”).
212. See id. at *9, *11 (characterizing the plaintiff’s expert report as
“methodologically sound and reliable,” but ultimately finding that the plaintiff
did not meet her burden of proof).
213. Id. at *9.
214. Id. (citation omitted).
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omitted variable bias and should not always negate the plaintiff’s
expert’s regression results.
B. Sample Size Examples
Our sample of recent Title VII cases includes several cases in
which the court discounted statistical evidence due to the size of
the sample analyzed. In Coleman v. Exxon Chemical Corp.,215 the
Southern District of Texas noted that “[w]hether a sample is too
small to yield meaningful results is a determination made by the
district court on a case-by-case basis.”216 It also recognized that
the Fifth Circuit had cautioned against relying on studies with
small sample sizes.217 In this race and gender discrimination
case, the court held that the sample size of forty individuals (of
which eight belonged to the protected class) was not inconclusive
as a matter of law, but “any statistical analysis derived from such
a small universe is far from conclusive and must be subjected to
close scrutiny for reliability.”218 As a result, the court held that
the statistical analysis was inadmissible.219 As noted above, valid
conclusions can be drawn from such a sample size. Unfortunately,
although the court did not hold the evidence inconclusive as a
matter of law, it still discounted the regression analysis and
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.220
In Guerrero v. Reno,221 the Northern District of Illinois
addressed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a
disparate impact claim of national origin discrimination.222 The

215. 162 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
216. Id. at 618 (quoting Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277,
1289 n.20 (5th Cir. 1994)).
217. See id. (discussing the problems associated with small sample sizes).
218. Id. Part of this consideration was motivated by the fact that the
inclusion of one outlier affected the results of the study. Id. at 618 n.34.
219. See id. at 617–20 (analyzing the plaintiffs’ statistical analysis and
finding “serious methodological flaws”).
220. See id. at 618, 620–21 (summarizing the court’s conclusions regarding
the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence).
221. No. 98 C 864, 2000 WL 1100400 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2000), aff’d sub nom.
Guerrero v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 2001).
222. Id. at *1.
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plaintiff presented a regression analysis to support his claim. 223
The regression showed a statistically significant disparity in the
hiring of Hispanics for a specific job.224 However, the defendant’s
expert attacked the report by arguing that a “sample size, of only
thirty-four openings, was too small for reliable analysis.”225
Although the court did not explicitly state that this argument had
merit, it did not give any weight to the regression analysis when
determining that the plaintiff had not introduced enough
evidence to survive summary judgment.226
In Thomas v. Deloitte Consulting LP, the defendant filed a
motion to exclude the report of an expert statistician, which
included a regression analysis.227 The report was submitted to
advance the plaintiff’s claims of age and gender discrimination in
the plaintiff’s termination.228 Ultimately, the court excluded the
report due to concerns about statistical significance,229 and this
discussion is expanded on in the following section.230 The court’s
final decision—that the statistical significance of the results
made the results unreliable—was also based on the “relatively
small sample size.”231 However, as noted above, smaller samples
actually make it more difficult to find statistically significant
results, and thus, the court’s statement was misguided. In fact,
the small sample size should have led the court to be more
accepting of higher levels of statistical significance, and as a
result, the court likely should not have excluded this evidence on
this basis.

223. Id. at *6.
224. Id.
225. Id. at *7.
226. See id. at *14 (discussing the court’s reasoning for finding insufficient
evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim).
227. No. 3–02–CV–0343–M, 2004 WL 1960097, at *1, *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2,
2004).
228. Id at *1.
229. See id. at *6 (excluding the plaintiff’s report because the analysis
“either failed to test for statistical significance or did not use the proper
threshold for statistical significance”).
230. See infra Part V.C (citing examples of cases in which courts addressed
statistical significance issues).
231. See Thomas, 2004 WL 1960097, at *5 (discussing the court’s reasoning
for excluding the plaintiff’s expert report).
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The above examples from the sample of cases that we
analyzed illustrate how arguments of sample size can taint a
court’s decision at stages as early as evidentiary and summary
judgment motions. Even if these arguments do not lead to an
exclusionary motion or summary judgment ruling for the
defendant, if the arguments are made again in the courtroom,
they still have the opportunity to influence the judge or jury.
C. Statistical Significance Examples
In addition to Thomas, discussed in Part III.B above, in our
sample of cases, there are several examples of the court strictly
requiring a certain level of statistical significance for regression
results to be admissible and persuasive. In E.E.O.C. v. Autozone,
Inc.,232 the EEOC brought a disparate treatment claim of race
discrimination and a pattern or practice claim of gender
discrimination.233 To support the sex discrimination claim, the
EEOC presented a regression analysis; however, the defendant
challenged the analysis, claiming that the statistical significance
of the main result was not reliable because it was significant at
the 5% level and the Supreme Court had previously required
significance at 2.3% in a different case.234 Even though the court
correctly identified that the previous case dealt with a one-sided
test, and this case dealt with a two-sided test, the court still
implied that it would require 5% significance in a two-sided
test.235 The court stated that “an approximation of two standard
deviations at 5% is acceptable.”236 Because the plaintiff’s results
were significant at 5% in a two-sided test, the court did rely on

232. No. 00-2923 Ma/A, 2006 WL 2524093 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2006).
233. Id. at *1.
234. See id. at *3 (criticizing the plaintiff’s regression analysis because it
used “an arbitrary significance level that [did] not conform to the requirements
of Castaneda v. Partida” (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17
(1977))).
235. See id. (noting that “[t]wo standard deviations is often approximated at
5% for two-tailed tests” (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 318 n.5 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
236. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311
n.17 (1977)).
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the statistical evidence and did not grant summary judgment on
the sex discrimination claim on that basis.237
In Boyd v. Interstate Brands Corps.,238 the plaintiffs
presented regression analyses to support class certification for
their race discrimination claims.239 These regressions sought to
prove a statistically significant disparity in promotions based on
race.240 However, the court and the opposing experts challenged
the results because they were not statistically significant.241 The
plaintiff’s expert’s report found results that were statistically
significant at the 7% level (or with p-values of .07) in a two-sided
test.242 As a result, the report found that “the disparity in
promotions for the relevant period was ‘within 0.02 of being
statistically significant.’”243 Unfortunately, because of this
(incorrect) statement, the court held that it did not even need to
address the credibility of the report to determine that the
plaintiffs did not meet their burden in establishing
commonality.244 If the Eastern District of New York had not
previously required statistical significance at the 5% level, then
the expert would not have likely stated that his results were not
statistically significant; perhaps, the court should have ignored
the expert’s statement and relied on this valid statistical evidence
to show commonality. If courts continue to apply such strict
bright-line standards, then valid statistical evidence will not be
introduced to support the claims of employment discrimination.
237. See id. at *3–7 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff
used an arbitrary significance level, but ultimately deciding that the plaintiff’s
results could not be considered relevant evidence due to flaws in the regression
analyses).
238. 256 F.R.D. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
239. Id. at 362.
240. Id. at 360.
241. See id. at 361 (noting that the plaintiff’s expert “did not find a
statistically significant disparity in promotion rates between African-American
and non-African-American employees”).
242. See Declaration of Mark R. Killingsworth ¶ 15, tbl. 5, Boyd v.
Interstate Brands Corps., 256 F.R.D. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 00-CV-2249
(JFB)(RML)), ECF No. 132-18 (summarizing the expert’s statistical findings
regarding promotions and race).
243. Boyd, 256 F.R.D. at 362.
244. See id. (determining that “plaintiffs cannot get past the fact that Dr.
Killingsworth did not find a statistically significant disparity in promotion
rates”).
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VI. Potential Solution
Regression analyses can provide valuable evidence for both
parties in employment discrimination cases, where direct
evidence is often hard to come by. While we recognize the ability
of experts to manipulate statistical evidence and the unreliability
of certain techniques, we also recognize that these downfalls only
occur in very limited circumstances. Opposing counsel and their
experts are expected to attack the introduction of any evidence,
but these attacks can also be manipulated and unreliable. When
a plaintiff presents regression results establishing that she was
treated differently in the workplace because she was a member of
the protected class, the defendant often presents regression
results contradicting those results. In addition, the defendant
critiques the plaintiff’s regressions. However, three of the most
common arguments made (that the regression suffers from
omitted variables, a small sample size, and a lack of statistical
significance) are only arguments with true merit in very few
circumstances.245 As illustrated in Part IV.D, the introduction of
these arguments decreases the probability that the plaintiff
prevails and decreases the significance of presenting valid
regression results that support the plaintiff’s case. As a result,
this Article proposes that the court exercise its gatekeeping
function by either acting under Daubert or establishing a peerreview system to guarantee that only valid challenges to
regression results enter the courtroom.
A. Using Daubert
Although it is a difficult task, judges are instructed under
Daubert to consider whether expert testimony “can be (and has
been) tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication, its known or potential error rate and the existence of
maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and whether
it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant
scientific community” before allowing the testimony to enter the
courtroom under Federal Rules of Evidence 702.246 As a result,
245.
246.

Supra Part III.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993); see

2422

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2365 (2014)

judges will likely analyze whether expert reports that present
regression results to establish or to refute employment
discrimination meet the Daubert considerations.247 However, it is
also important for judges to consider whether the plaintiff’s
expert’s attacks of the opposing expert’s statistical techniques
also meet the standards of Daubert.
It is just as important that judges attempt to determine
whether these criticisms are valid because they too have the
ability to persuade the jury; unjust criticisms can persuade the
jury to reject valid statistical evidence that can assist the plaintiff
in a discrimination case. Unfortunately, judges may not be aware
of the takeaways presented above and may be unable to
determine whether certain econometric critiques are actually
invalid. This Article proposes that judges consider these
takeaways and remember to analyze the reliability of criticisms
found in expert reports instead of only analyzing the actual
regression analyses.
Of course, we acknowledge that for judges to accurately make
this decision they must be at least familiar with these three
criticisms. Because experts will present both sides, the judge
must be able to make an educated decision based on the
underlying statistics. While this Article lays out exactly when
each of the three criticisms is valid, it would likely take more
than this brief exposure to guarantee that judges are prepared to
make such an important decision. Judges must be educated on a
variety of “scientific” topics to make any Daubert decision,
including the admissibility of regression analyses. Many solutions
to this education problem have been proposed. Scholars have
called for judicial seminars to educate judges before litigation and
independent research both before and during litigation.248 Both of
these methods could incorporate education on econometric
also FED. R. EVID. 702 (Testimony by Expert Witness).
247. See D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions,
and Fit in Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 1933, 1985–87
(2001) (recognizing the importance of strictly analyzing statistics under
Daubert).
248. See Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert
Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1270–75 (2007) (suggesting ways of “improving
scientific admissibility decisions” through an educative approach). The use of
court-appointed experts is discussed infra Part VI.B.
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criticism. In particular, judicial conferences, such as the Science
for Judges program,249 which are already in place, could easily
make this incorporation. This Article could also serve as a source
for judges seeking independent research. However, because
educating judges is often time-consuming and impractical,250 we
suggest that courts adopt a peer-review system. If a court adopts
a peer-review system, such as the one proposed below, then the
reliance on judicial education will be diminished.
B. Using Peer Review
Scholars concerned about the potential for junk science
entering the courtroom through expert witness testimony have
suggested several potential solutions to reduce those difficulties
discussed in Part II.B. These proposed solutions include the use
of court-appointed experts under Federal Rules of Evidence
706;251 however, scholars have noted that this solution is not
often practiced because it interferes with the adversary
process.252 Other solutions propose the establishment of a center
of scientific experts that would act as a selection mechanism for
potential court-appointed experts253 and of an intermediary
agency that answers blind technical questions for parties
involved in litigation.254 Lawrence Pinsky also suggested that
expert testimony be peer reviewed in a more traditional sense.255
249. See Cheng, supra note 248, at 1273 (discussing judicial education
programs).
250. See id. at 1273–74 (discussing difficulties with judicial education).
251. See FED. R. EVID. 706 (Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses). Many states
also have a similar rule. See Cheng, supra note 248, at 1270 & n.21 (noting that
many states permit court-appointed experts).
252. See Karen Butler Reisinger, Note, Court-Appointed Expert Panels: A
Comparison of Two Models, 32 IND. L. REV. 225, 235–36 (1998) (discussing the
opposition to court-appointed experts).
253. See Pinsky, supra note 53, at 545 (explaining solutions for assisting
judges with handling complex scientific evidence).
254. See Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
174, 206–09 (2010) (detailing the concept of using an intermediary agency to
“function[] as a broker between sponsors of research (e.g., plaintiffs) and
potential expert witnesses (e.g., doctors)”).
255. See Pinsky, supra note 53, at 558–62 (outlining the traditional methods
of peer review).
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In this solution, experts would present their reports during a
pretrial hearing, and those reports would then be submitted to a
committee for peer review.256 The opinions of the committee
would then be submitted to the judge and parties for review, and
the judge would then make a decision about the admissibility of
the evidence before trial.257
Pinsky’s proposed solution of peer review is a viable solution
that would assist judges in not only determining whether
regression analyses should enter the courtroom under Daubert
but also in determining whether the criticisms of regression
analyses should be admitted. If this proposed peer-review process
applied in an employment discrimination case with regression
analyses, both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s experts would
present reports regarding the analysis they performed, including
details on the variables included in the regression, the size of the
sample, and how they calculated the statistical significance. In
addition, the experts would also submit reports addressing their
concerns with the opposing party’s reports. Each of these reports
would then be submitted for peer review. Economists skilled in
regression analysis would undertake this peer-review process,
submitting a response addressing actual deficiencies in the
regression analysis and acknowledging whether the opposing
expert’s concerns have any merit. The judge would then take the
peer-review commentary into account when determining not only
whether the regression results should enter the courtroom but
whether the opposing counsel and expert arguments that
challenge the opposing party’s regression should also be
restricted. Alternatively, the court could simply rely on the peerreview commentary to expose the actual limitations of the
regressions and not allow any additional criticisms to enter the
courtroom.
Specifically, we propose a peer-review system in which both
parties agree to provide a certain percentage of the fees the
parties paid to their econometric experts to finance peer
review.258 Peer reviewers would be economists who do not
256. See id. at 543–44 (discussing a proposed peer-review solution to assist
judges in determining the scientific validity of methodology employed by
experts).
257. See id. (detailing the proposed peer-review solution).
258. If the plaintiff wins and the judge awards attorney’s fees, then the
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generally serve as litigation experts but who are experienced with
peer review as academic scholars. Because academic economists
serve as peer reviewers for academic journals for no
compensation (occasionally a token payment is made),
compensation on the order of 5% to 10% of the total billings by
experts will provide adequate compensation to induce academic
economists to participate on occasion. The judge would select the
peer reviewers similar to how a judge chooses a court-appointed
expert under Rule 706.259 By selecting economists who do not
generally serve as litigation experts, potential conflicts of interest
will be avoided, as these economists will have no incentive to
sway standards in expectation of benefiting from establishing
statistical precedents.260
A summary of the proposed process follows: each party will
submit one report; either both parties will submit their original
analyses (if both plaintiff and defendant provide a primary
analysis) or the plaintiff will submit a report and the defendant
will submit its rebuttal report. At this point, both reports will be
submitted to the peer reviewer who will advise the judge on the
legitimacy of the reports and critiques. Based on the judge’s
assessment, invalid econometric critiques will be taken off the
table, allowing parties to focus on only the appropriate and
relevant issues in further rounds of expert reports and rebuttals
and at trial.

judge could also award peer-review fees.
259. See FED. R. EVID. 706 (“The court may appoint any expert that the
parties agree on and any of its own choosing.”).
260. Anecdotally, many academic economists consider the litigation battle of
experts to be difficult and often dishonest. As a result, economists who might be
willing to be involved in litigation consulting if academic standards are
maintained refuse to be involved as experts in anticipation that unscrupulous
opposing experts (often professional consultants rather than academic
economists) will launch erroneous and deceitful critiques. Because professional
consultants have the advantage of greater litigation experience and are less
concerned about their professional academic reputation, many qualified
academic economists are driven out of the litigation arena. The proposed peerreview system would allow academic standards to enter courts’ decision-making
processes as an enhancement to the current adversarial process.
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VII. Conclusion

Regression analysis has served an important role in
employment discrimination cases for more than thirty-five years.
Unfortunately, even though statistical evidence has become
critical to the plaintiff’s case in employment discrimination cases,
regression analyses presented by a plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case of disparate impact or disparate treatment do not
increase the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing in a case. Often
the inability of valid regression analysis to assist a party is the
result of the opposing expert’s introduction of invalid econometric
concerns. Because three of the most often cited econometric
critiques are only valid in certain circumstances, judges must be
aware that allowing such criticisms to enter the courtroom can
influence the jury in a negative and unjustified way. As a result,
judges should analyze the econometric criticisms presented under
Daubert and limit the introduction of invalid econometric
critiques. Because this solution likely requires extensive
education of judges, courts should consider adopting a peerreview system that would rely on unbiased economists and
guarantee that only valid regression results and valid
econometric critiques enter the courtroom. Without such
measures, flawed econometric critiques will continue to
completely invalidate valid statistical evidence.
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